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Methodology:
This evaluation was conducted and written by an external consultant 1 between April and May 2001.
The evaluation consisted of direct observation of all aspects of the programme and numerous interviews
by the consultant of key staff within and outside HI. In addition 19 case studies based on semistructured interviews were compiled and form annex A.. A total of 1113 individual interviews with pretested questionnaires were carried out in the 5 target provinces and the 41 target districts. These
questionnaires targeted different groups in different communities, as is explained in the report. Copies
of these questionnaires can be found in the annexes. The design of the evaluation by the consultant
was based on the Terms of References for the evaluation and can be found as annex D. Existing HI
national staff (supervisors) conducted the questionnaire survey , the national data staff at the Kandahar
office entered the data prior to analysis. All questionnaire results and statistical tabulations (Excel) have
been left with HI office in Afghanistan.

Introduction to CBMAP (overview):
Briefly, the HI community based mine awareness programme (CBMAP) is a programme that began in
southern Afghanistan in 1996 in order to establish sustainable and appropriate mine awareness to rural
communities at high risk to mines and UXO. The central vehicle used to disseminate mine awareness
information is locally recruited staff (Nomaindas) who conduct direct mine awareness training as well as
identify and train mine committees (MCs) as village volunteers to maintain and reiterate the mine
awareness message. It is a pyramidal structure from HI trainers to these Nomaindas and then to the
many MC at the village level. The programme has grown considerably over the years and not only
transfers information to reduce accidents but also collects information from the villages (through the
MCs) concerning UXO, mine injury data and new previously unidentified minefields. The community
based approach with unpaid volunteers was innovative when it began and appears to be effective.
Working in 5 provinces in 2001 and 41 districts of high risk, and expanding every year, the programme
has never been evaluated. This evaluation was commissioned by HI Belgium .

1

Chris Horwood
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Executive Summary:
This report considers the CBMAP to have established an conceptual approach and operational structure
that allows mine awareness to be highly sustainable in a target area and among population groups of a
considerable size. The programme is culturally and socially appropriate in design and its structure
allows a single community-based Nomainda ( HI staff representative) to monitor and interface with a
large number of volunteer mine committees (MCs). While the statistics do not allow us to draw a direct
correlation between mine awareness dissemination and reduced injury levels there is substantial
statistical and circumstantial information to suggest that people in HI’s areas are more ‘mine smart’ and
have changed reduced risk-taking activities to some degree. Data in this report will illustrate this.
Handicap’s CBMAP pyramidal structure takes time and resources to set up , but once it is functioning it
has a immense capacity to deliver mine awareness to an ever increasing number of affected
communities. Due to ‘economies of scale’ and the capacity of the Nomaindas to create and monitor
large numbers of mine committees, the CBMAP can continue to offer its benefits to an increasing
number of people at a decreasing cost per capita ( i.e. person trained).
Mine awareness seeks to reduce dangerous and risk-taking practises through the teaching of ‘mine
smart’ knowledge: as long as there are mines and UXO this is a damage limitation exercise and not a
damage control exercise. There will never be the perfect mine awareness programme but a community
based, voluntary and self-sustaining network of trainer and information collectors is a significant
achievement that deserves recognition. This evaluation finds this approach to be the most appropriate
currently in use in Afghanistan in terms of pedagogical approach and sustainability.
The volunteer network in many hundreds of villages in affected areas gives HI a high capacity for
valuable information transfer :The secondary benefits of the community based network enables HI to
collect, on a regular basis, important data concerning mine victims, previously unidentified minefields
and location of UXO. Such a system would be costly to establish independently and should be valued
as a major output of the programme. If and when this data is managed in a more effective way it should
offer considerable added value to the mine action sector in Afghanistan . Despite the disappointing
standard of victim data collection nationally , but also within HI’s programme, HI is well placed to
improve the data collected in its regions substantially as well as take a lead nationally. In this regard HI
should vigorously promote the establishment of the national data collection plan as laid out in the
AMVIS proposal written in 2000.
The CBMAP system is evaluated to be appropriate to facilitate a long term or short term involvement by
HI. They have set up a low cost system that requires low staff and low maintenance. In terms of
sustainability 98% of MCs interviewed indicated that they would continue to act as the mine committee
when HIs support and involvement in their communities curtailed
HIs relative negligence in developing a strategy to create a community based volunteer system among
the most vulnerable sections of the population (Kuchi nomads) represents a missed opportunity that
can and should be rectified immediately.
Another area of weakness highlighted in this evaluation is the method used for village and MC selection
at the district level. The survey results indicate a high number of villages, that currently do not receive
mine awareness through an MC, consider themselves exposed to high risk. This too needs to be
addressed immediately. In addition to this the study identified the need for further attention by CBMAP
to the exact coverage capacity of MCs within their villages. Some evidence suggests that some of the
MCs do not reach a large proportion of their village population.
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HI is already using the BBC programmes as a vehicle for mine awareness ‘radio forum’ in their project
area to considerable effect. This evaluation recommends that they greatly expand their promotion
(through providing radios) and harness the power of this available and popular resource.
HI has always worked closely with the UN Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan. HI’s link through the
Regional MAPA offices has enabled ammunition reports generated from their community-based
information to be partially addressed . But due to the high number of requests generated there has been
an urgent need for more EOD teams. HI’s current plan to develop 2 new EOD teams in 2001 is
commendable, if not overdue.
In terms of strategic planning and organisational ‘vision’ this evaluation recommends HIB to consider all
possible mine action options when seeking to address the needs of mine risk communities and not
restrict itself to mine awareness. The recent development of 2 EOD teams is a positive development. It
is recommended that the progress of AREA (innovative and successful community-based demining
agency in Afghanistan) be studied by HI and that a possible adoption of a similar approach be
considered in Southern Afghanistan.
Despite the relatively large number of agencies working in mine action in Afghanistan, it is a huge
country with major geographical, political and climatic constraints. A large number of people continue to
be directly affected by landmines and UXO both economically, social and physically (with high numbers
of casualties) even after 12 years of mine action operations. This evaluation commends the CBMAP for
the success of its programme and contributions made to reducing the threat , but also encourages HI to
continue considering ways it can maximise its intervention on behalf of mine affected communities.
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1. 1

Achievements as set against stated goals, aims and objectives.

5

As expressed in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation the two overall objectives of this program
are:
 To reduce instances of mine/UXO accidents among civilian populations in rural communities of
southern Afghanistan, through direct and indirect mine awareness training.
 To develop mine awareness in communities and create a sustainable mine awareness capacity,
which endures once the project is finished.
Although this evaluation is designed to comment on CBMAP since its inception (1996) the
evaluation itself is mostly funded as part of the project activities under the current contract with
the EC Commission as part of the consortium led by the NGO, MADERA. As expressed in the
Aug 1999 contract between HIB and the European Union the goal and project purpose are
expressed as follows:
The goal of this programme is to arrive within a period of 24 months to a reduction of mines
accidents through the development of mine awareness within rural communities and the
creation of a sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network that will
continue after the end of the project.
Specifically, the project will have the following results:
200,000 villagers trained to Mine Awareness (villagers and nomads)
400 Mine Committees created in focus districts and provinces
600 unexploded ordnance reports collected in focus districts and provinces.
Findings of 1.1 Achievements as set against stated goals, aims and objectives.
Specific results
With respect to these specific results the CBMAP has, between August 1999 and April 2001 (two
months short of the contract period with the EC) :
 Trained (direct and indirect) in mine awareness over 736, 000 villagers and pastoral nomads
(Kuchie). This is an over achievement of 350% above the target number.
 Created 542 new mine committee. This is an over achievement of 135% above the target level.
 Documented and collected 1664 ammunition reports from affected villages. An over achievement of
277%.
These achievements are very commendable and illustrate that the system in place to achieve these
different project output are working well and to far higher levels than expected. Possibly they also show
that HI set their targets low or are not aware themselves of the capacity of their system to generate
these results. It should be clear that these levels of achievement will probably not be repeated in the
future in the same areas: There will be a finite limit to how many Mine Committees (MCs) a province
needs and how many people need training. Equally there will be a limit to how many ammunition reports
HI will receive from the same areas over time.
Reducing mine incidents
With respect to the stated goal of reducing mine incidents in the project area it must be said that
seeking to establish a direct correlation between changes in mine/UXO incidents and mine awareness
dissemination is problematic and misleading. By isolating mine awareness training as a single factor
affecting mine/UXO incidents this evaluation would be ignoring the fact that mine / UXO incidents are
the result of a complex interplay of physical, seasonal and attitudinal factors. There are serious limiting
factors in assessing this objective. This has also been found to be the case in other countries where an
evaluation of mine awareness impact has been attempted as well as in a previous national mine
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awareness evaluation (CIET 1998) in Afghanistan. Nevertheless some findings concerning this central
CBMAP objective and these can be found below in section 1.4.
Sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network
Concerning the creation of a sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network, the
programme has developed an approach that has proved to be sustainable (to date) and has resulted in
an effective mine information network that almost entirely covers mine affected districts of southern
Afghanistan, including Ghazni to the east and Farah to the west. In addition it appears that the network
of information gathering and mine awareness dissemination will be sustainable in the long term due to
the structure of the CBMAP and the particular social and cultural conditions of rural Afghanistan. This is
discussed throughout the report and particularly section 3.
Information transfer network
Currently the programme covers hundreds of villages in 38 districts in the five provinces. Three districts
regarded as mine affected and needing mine awareness (according to HI’s internal needs assessment)
are not yet covered.2 The network of mine committees continues to grow every month increasing
CBMAP’s coverage. The approach currently used for this information transfer from HI to villagers (i.e.
mine awareness) and from villagers to the mine action community ( victim data and munitions reports
via HI) is judged to be an extraordinarily effective network in terms of reaching a large amount of rural
people through a relatively low-cost and low-maintenance staffing structure. The details of the level of
effectiveness of this mine awareness approach, and the substance, reliability and end use of the
information network is evaluated in various sections below.

1.2

Comparison between villages covered by the project and those not covered.

As explained in the ‘Methodology’ section village questionnaires were used were used in randomly
selected villages evenly spread across the 41 districts of the 5 provinces of Handicap’s area of
activities.
These 1113 individual interviews (377 adults / 736 children) contain a wide range of information which
provides the statistical backbone of this evaluation and more detailed information that may be useful to
HI at a latter date for planning and prioritisation etc. Additionally they could provide a baseline database
for further evaluation at a later data to monitor the progress and effectiveness of their programme in
these selected villages.
1.2.1 Statistical comparison between villages in terms of ‘mine smart’3 knowledge:
Examples of all questionnaires can be found in the annexes.
Questionnaire 1a:
The adults in villages where CBMAP operates (either with direct or indirect training) answered all
questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 91% . In response to a group
of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper with mines or UXO’
messages, 94% of adults responded correctly. In response to a group of more difficult questions
concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and what to do if you
find yourself in a minefield’, the adults answered 88% correctly.4

2

One district in Kandahar province where HI has repeatedly failed to recruit a reliable representative,
and 2 other districts in Farah which are so far from the provincial capital that logistical considerations
have prevented CBMAP establishing representatives.
3
A useful term used in the 1998 CIET evaluation of mine awareness in Afghanistan referring to the
level of knowledge concerning the essential safety and advice messages of mine awareness
programmes.
4
‘Correctly’ here does not mean the answered every point of every question correctly but that in each
question they answered enough points to show that they were ‘mine smart’ by this evaluations’
standard.
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Questionnaire 1b:
The children (65% boys / 35% girls) in villages where CBMAP operates (either with direct or indirect
training) answered all questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 84% .
In response to a group of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper
with mines or UXO’ messages, 95% of children responded correctly. In response to a group of more
difficult questions concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and
what to do if you find yourself in a minefield’, the children answered 73% correctly. These children were
particularly weak concerning the question of recognition of a typically mined area, only 42% answering
correctly.
Questionnaire 2a:
The adults in villages where CBMAP does not operate answered all questions relating to ‘mine
smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 70% . In response to a group of simple questions
concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper with mines or UXO’ messages, 79% of adults
responded correctly. In response to a group of more difficult questions concerning ‘recognition of mined
areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and what to do if you find yourself in a minefield’, the
adults answered 61% correctly. These adults were particularly weak concerning the question of
recognition of a typically mined area, only 33% answering correctly.
(Of interest, 74% of these adults interviewed claimed to have had some form of one-off mine awareness
training at some point in the last few years, but not from HI.)
Questionnaire 2b:
The children ( 63% boys / 36% girls) in villages where CBMAP does not operate answered all
questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 53% . In response to a group
of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper with mines or UXO’
messages, 75% of these children responded correctly. In response to a group of more difficult questions
concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and what to do if you
find yourself in a minefield’, only 32% of the children answered correctly.
Questionnaire 3a:
The adults kuchies interviewed in encampments where CBMAP does not have mine committees
answered all questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 73% . In
response to a group of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper with
mines or UXO’ messages, 76% of kuchi adults responded correctly. In response to a group of more
difficult questions concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and
what to do if you find yourself in a minefield’, the adults answered 70% correctly. . Of those questioned
in this category (kuchi adults) 61% said that they had had mine awareness before. 59 % of these
indicated it was from an HI Nomainda.(over a quarter of those interviewed).
Questionnaire 3b:
The kuchie children (54% boys / 46% girls) interviewed in encampments where CBMAP does not
have mine committees answered all questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an
overall level of 65% . In response to a group of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t
handle and don’t tamper with mines or UXO’ messages, 81% of these children responded correctly. In
response to a group of more difficult questions concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking,
mine signs, precautions and what to do if you find yourself in a minefield’, the kuchi children answered
49% correctly. Of those questioned in this category (kuchi children) 53% said that they had had mine
awareness before. 50 % of these said it was from an HI Nomainda.(approximately a quarter of those
interviewed).
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Table No 1:
table:

The above narrative information is illustrated in the following, comparative ‘mine smart’

Adults
trained by
CBMAP

Children
trained by
CBMAP

Adults not
trained by
CBMAP

Children
not trained
by CMBAP

Kuchi
adults
(approx
30%
received
some
training)

Kuchie
Children
(approx
25%
received
some
training)

Sample size (total 1113)

210

419

91

173

76

144

Proportion correctly answering
simple ‘don’t touch’ questions

94%

95%

79%

75%

76%

81%

Proportion answering correctly
more specific mine awareness
questions.

88%

73%

61%

32%

70%

49%

91%

84%

70%

53%

73%

65%

Percentile breakdown of ‘mine
smart’ responses to 1113
questionnaires to different
communities in 41 districts in 5
provinces
where
CBMAP
operates.

Proportion correctly answering
‘mine smart’ questions overall.
(i.e. both categories above)

N.B. Generally it is wise to be cautious drawing too many conclusions from data drawn from questionnaires. Some
people (especially children) may have not correctly understood the questions, or the questions themselves may
not have been designed well enough to elicit the full knowledge of the interviewee etc. All questionnaires are
included in English in the annexes.

Findings of 1.2.1: Statistical comparison between villages in terms of ‘mine smart’5 knowledge
 In terms of ‘mine smart’ knowledge, based on the key, repeated messages of CBMAP, those
villagers within Handicap’s mine awareness programme clearly have a higher knowledge than
those outside the programme. The kuchi , some of whom had received some direct training scored
a little higher than those communities that had received no training at all.
 Many of the questions relating to mine awareness in general are common sense and therefore it is
not surprising that those not trained by the CBMAP still scored relatively highly overall (70%) on
mine awareness questions. ( e.g. When asked whether ‘there is ever a situation where it is good to
touch a mine.’ extremely few people would respond to the affirmative whether they had been
trained or not!)
 It is pertinent that those villagers outside of CBMAP activities scored lower on the more demanding
questions concerning recognition of minefields, how to recognise mine marking, natural signs and
what are the safest activities when you find yourself in an unknown or mined area. The mine smart
knowledge concerning these kinds of questions require a range of responses and need to be taught
for people to be aware of them. Where HI has been training the knowledge is significantly higher on
these issues, particularly when comparing the children.
 We can conclude that the statistics from the results of the questionnaires illustrate that adults and
children within CBMAP possess significantly more ‘mine smart’ knowledge. This is a positive
affirmation of the programmes success in transferring ‘mine smart’ knowledge. It does not ,
however, illustrate to what level this knowledge may influences changes away from risk-taking
behaviour.
5

A useful term used in the 1998 CIET evaluation of mine awareness in Afghanistan referring to the
level of knowledge concerning the essential safety and advice messages of mine awareness
programmes.
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Gender separation and comments

All Nomainda and mine committees are male. Anyone familiar with the culture of Afghanistan (now more
rigorously enforced by the Taleban regime) makes the training in women and girls above puberty very
difficult. This is not the case among the kuchies where women enjoy more freedom and can, in most
cases, attend mine awareness training. This is illustrated by the records that show a far larger number
of kuchi women and girls attending mine awareness trainings than in settled villagers. (see table 2).
Generally females (due to their restricted movements outside of their home) are far less exposed to risk
than male. Again, the kuchi women are different as they are exposed to far greater mobility and freedom
among the camps and during their nomadic travels.
The use of women in the training teams is virtually impossible. The Taleban have banned the use of
women as paid workers in NGOs unless they are directly involved in health work. HI has taken the
position of accepting the current parameters in Afghanistan and despite considering ideas to develop
husband and wife teams of MC they have not implemented the concept to date. The two main reasons
is that the female MC would not be able to be monitored by anyone except her husband, and they fear
that if they upset the authorities on this issue they could jeopardise their whole programme. As long as
the proportion of female casualties remains low (under 6% females over the age of 17yrs6) they feel this
approach is justified and this evaluation concurs.
Despite these conditions this evaluation considers it important that HI strives to present trainings to girls
and women. HI do have high access to girls who are, after all, tomorrow’s women. CBMAP have
documented the training of a total of 55,184 women in direct and indirect (including radio forums) since
1996. 51% of these were kuchie attendees. Since 1996 they have documented the training of 149,491
girls of whom 30% were kuchie girls. The female trainees therefore represent only 16.4% of all people
trained by CBMAP. Adult women only represent 4% of all people trained between 1996 and April 2001.
This is shown in table 2 below. In general the only way village women receive training is if they are
related in some way to the Nomainda or MC and therefore he is able to gain access to the compound or
home where women live. Older women can sometimes freely participate in trainings with children and
men in trainings outside of their home. Apart from this there are no ways for the Nomainda or MC to
have contact or train village women. The situation in the kuchi camps is more liberal as the statistics
indicate.
Table No 2.

Sexual and age division of trainees recorded by CBMAP (1996-Apr 2001).

Direct,
indirect MEN
and radio forum
training attendees
(incl kuchi)
Total trained by 430,586
CMAP since 1996
Percentile
of 34.6%
total

WOMEN

BOYS

GIRLS

TOTAL

55,184

609,066

149,491

1,244,327

4.4%

49%

12%

100%

In the case studies in certain villages the men said they would inform their wives about mine awareness
themselves and therefore it was unnecessary for women to have direct training from outsiders or even
the MCs. The HI staff clam that this attitude is fairly universal. CBMAP has far greater access to the
younger generation of boys and girls although boys, again, have more freedom and mobility away from
their homes than girls. The fact that those conducting the interviews found it difficult to interview an
equal number of boys to girls for this evaluation is further evidence of this fact. (see sample size
differences). A clear exception to this being the kuchi where they interviewed almost the same amount
6

Based on data of 788 accidents since 1996 recorded by CBMAP. ICRC’s data show a similarly low
level for women.
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of boys to girls.) The following table displays the gender breakdown between boys and girls and their
level of ‘mine smart’ knowledge:
Table No 3.

Gender comparison; ‘Mine smart’ knowledge between boys and girls:
BOYS
trained by
CBMAP

GIRLS
trained by
CBMAP

BOYS not
trained by
CBMAP

GIRLS not
trained by
CMBAP

Kuchi
BOYS
(approx.
25%
received
some
training)

Kuchie
GIRLS
(approx.
25%
received
some
training)

Sample size (total 736)

273

146

111

62

78

66

Proportion correctly answering
simple ‘don’t touch’ questions

96%

92%

79%

70%

80%

83%

Proportion answering correctly
more specific mine awareness
questions.

71%

55%

38%

21%

51%

45%

84%

74%

59%

46%

66%

64%

Percentile breakdown of ‘mine
smart’ responses to 736
questionnaires to boys and girls
in different communities in 41
districts in 5 provinces where
CBMAP operates.

Proportion correctly answering
‘mine smart’ questions overall.
(i.e. both categories above)

Findings from the statistics:
There is a clear difference between the ‘mine smart’ knowledge between boys and girls whether they
attend mine awareness training or not. Boys are more ‘mine smart’, (or at least were able to answer the
questions with more confidence than the girls interviewed). There may be cultural and psychological
issues here concerning girls’ expectations and motivation to learn in a society that essentially prepares
them to be wives and mothers. Among the kuchi where women appear to have more social equality to
men it is interesting to note that the girls were almost exactly as ‘mine smart’ as the boys. As with the
table 1 showing the results of the questionnaire for adults and children, in this table we can see that the
kuchi children (of whom 25% claimed to have had some mine awareness at some point) scored better
results than communities that had received no mine awareness.
Although all children scored relatively low levels on the more complex questions (..concerning
recognition of minefields, recognising mine marking and safe behaviour in and around unknown areas
and/or minefields) those children with no mine awareness scored a very low level on these questions,
with girls in this category only answering 21% of the questions correctly. It should be added that in the
areas where CBMAP does not operate, of 264 adult and children questioned (in 41 districts) a
surprising 67% said they considered their village to have a direct problem of mines and UXO.7

Findings 1.2.2: Gender separation
⇒ A very small percentage of women receive mine awareness through CBMAP. Although there are
low levels of accidents among women they should have access to mine awareness education.
Islamic culture and the particular interpretation by the Taleban regime currently restricts this.
⇒ A greater number of girls have access to mine awareness but it is still far less that the number of
boys. CBMAP can take advantage of the access to pre-pubescent girls and offer mine awareness
training to this group where possible.
7

This could raise important questions for CBMAP and will be dealt with in sections concerning
targeting and selection of villages.(see section 2.2)
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⇒ Village boys are generally about 10% more ‘mine smart’ than girls (according to the questionnaire
results) whether they have received mine awareness training or not. Kuchi girls and boys were
found to be about equal in terms of 'mine smart' knowledge.
⇒ In villages where CBMAP operates girls scored well on questions concerning touching and contact
with mine/UXO but weak on the more practical situational questions.

1.3

Impact of training on behavioural change.

If the CBMAP seeks to influence behavioural change it implies that Afghans conduct certain unsafe
practices which cause injury and death to themselves and their livestock and that if they change their
behaviour in various respects they can live with greater safety in a mined / UXO environments.
Discussions with villagers and Kuchie, and victim data collected in Afghanistan, and in other countries
strongly supports this premise.
Children playing with mines and UXO8, men tampering with items to extract metal or explosive, people
not recognising minefield marking signs (man-made or natural), entering unknown but suspect areas,
travelling off-road etc. are all typical examples of activities that cause death and injury and which are in
most case avoidable. In addition to this the failure to recognise mines, UXO or booby traps through
ignorance also leads to subsequent activities that are dangerous. The 8 essential mine awareness
messages of the CBMAP, with the illustration of shapes and sizes of the most common mines and UXO
(models and flyers) is designed to address people’s lack of awareness and their practice of risky
behaviour.
Many Afghan men spent the 1980s fighting as Mujahedeen and are very familiar with UXO and mines.
Also in many mine/UXO affected areas the population have seen the devastating effects of abandoned
weapons at first hand leading to some critics of mine awareness to claim that mine awareness is
‘preaching to the converted’ and therefore unnecessary. However, the reality is that in many cases the
exact opposite is true. Repeatedly villagers admit that only by listening to the messages of mine
awareness and hearing the stories of mine victims (part of CBMAP’s presentation) they have come to
realise just how dangerous and certain risk-taking activities are. This was stated by villagers in almost
all of the case studies and mine committees (MCs) interviewed during this evaluation.
The difference between an intellectual knowledge of a fact and actual changes in behaviour is a
profound difference and one which directly concerns the objectives of mine awareness education.
People rarely absorb and/or act on new information on first hearing, and professional educators and
communication specialists know that repetition, or reiteration, is vital. It is astonishing that many mine
awareness approaches in Afghanistan as well as in other countries continue to promote mine
awareness through one-off direct trainings, based on the optimistic idea that people will both learn and
understand new information, as well as change their risky behaviour, based on a single presentation9.
The CBMAP has developed a system of mine awareness that is first based on direct training
(through the visits of Nomaindas) and then reiterated with regular refresher training (through a
community based mine committee). 10

8
This activity is the single-most significant cause of death and injury in HI’s project areas and is
discussed later in this report.
9
Possibly for mine /UXO recognition and emergency warning messages a single presentation is useful,
but for attitudinal and behavioural changes it cannot be adequate.
10
The Mine Action Plan for Afghanistan are now (after a decade of direct training) promoting a mine
awareness approach (using village volunteers/representatives) identical to CBMAP which HI has used
since 1996.
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Assessing the impact of direct and indirect training regarding behavioural change among a wide range
of villagers is complex. Any assessment of behavioural change is limited by the tools it must use as a
substitute to direct observation of villagers activities. There are three ways to consider the issue:
 From the statistical evidence of the changes in the number of injuries and deaths caused over
time in the CBMAP area that are caused by risk-taking behaviour ( mainly playing, handling,
tampering of mines/UXO but also other activities..) See section 1.4 below.
 From the group interviews / case studies and feedback from MC in the villages about the
behaviour of their communities..
 From the answers of villagers collected through the questionnaires.
Although all those interviewed for the study were questioned on the matter it is clear that few people will
admit that they have not changed their behaviour having been trained in mine awareness. Nevertheless
the findings of these questions were interesting:






In villages across 41 districts where the CBMAP operates, 88% (of 210 adults interviewed) claimed
that their behaviour had changed due to mine awareness training.
In the same areas, 75% of adult kuchis (75 interviewed ) said that mine awareness changes
behaviour, while of 144 kuchi children interviewed only 54% said mine awareness changed their
behaviour..
All sixty mine committees interviewed (100%) claimed that behaviour had changed in their villages
as a result of mine awareness training. They gave as evidence of this that people would no longer
touch unknown objects any more, that tampering and playing with mines/UXO had ended, that
villagers would not enter unknown or marked areas.
Perhaps the most common evidence of change given by the MCs was the prevalence of reporting
UXO and mines to the MC. While this is a commendable development this evaluation notes that as
the villagers had neither mines representative in the village nor forms before CBMAP(i.e. no means
of reporting ammunition ), we therefore have no control mechanism to measure whether it is the
impact of mine awareness that has caused this ‘change of behaviour’.

Findings of 1.3: Impact of training on behavioural change
 The evidence from the 210 adult villagers and 76 adult kuchi interviews indicates that people
themselves regard mine awareness as having changed their behaviour in relation to mines/UXO.
They value mine awareness and want regular refresher indirect training as they see it as being
linked to safer behaviour around mines/UXO.
 The Mine Committees questioned for this evaluation (60 in 5 provinces) all claim that their
communities have changed their behaviour towards mine/UXO to some degree. They list particular
changes of activities as evidence of this. If their claims are accurate this is a positive indicator that
mine awareness is having an impact in this regard.
 The statistical data in one province (Helmand) strongly indicates a big reduction in injuries and
deaths between 1996-2000. Within this data the number of child-victims due to playing and
tampering also greatly reduced as a proportion of the total. This could indicate that CBMA has been
successful at some level, but unfortunately data from other provinces that have also been receiving
CBMA for some years do not indicate similar trends. The data is too weak to draw reliable
conclusions.
 That the successful development of large amounts of ammunitions reports from villagers through
the MCs cannot be used as a indication of behavioural change even though there is strong
circumstantial evidence to suggest that people no longer touch items and make and effort to report
them to the MC as a result of the presence and trainings of the MCs. This is a positive indicator of
safer practices resulting from the project.
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 That the measurement of behavioural change continues to be a challenge to those implementing
and evaluating mine awareness where no reliable baseline victim data or behavioural analysis
exists. Without these no serious conclusions can be drawn during or following programme
implementation..

1.4

Statistical correlations between incident frequency and project activities.

In this section the critical issue of victim data collection and its management needs to be discussed
before examining statistical correlations:
1.4.1

Poor data:

The statistical data on mine/UXO victims in Afghanistan is weak and has been severely neglected. It is
not systematic or regular , it has been collected sporadically by different agencies over the years, has
been poorly processed, if at all, by MAPA as the central data-collating agency. Only recently have the
various agencies even agreed to use the same format for information collecting.
The 3 agencies collecting mine incident data are HI, ICRC and MCPA (Mine Clearance Planning
Agency). MCPA has a poor data base with very little information collected by its own survey and
clearance teams. These teams are busy with other work and not dedicated to collection of data and also
leave an area once their task is complete. Clearly this is highly inadequate for a systematic process.
ICRC have collected data for 3 years through hospitals and clinics and numerous health centres. They
now have a dedicated team of staff for data collection but their data is limited entirely to areas that have
health centres and the victims that actually use the facilities. The dead or those with minor injuries are
not represented therefore and neither can they cover the whole country. However the evidence
suggests that ICRC's collection from its own centres may be very inadequate. An example of the
discrepancies between HI and ICRC data can be seen in the following table;
Table No 4

Comparison of victim data for selected provinces HI/ICRC for the same years:

Handicap
ICRC
Handicap
ICRC
Handicap
ICRC
Kandahar
Kandahar
Helmand
Helmand
Zabul
Zabul
1998
119
6*
41
4
26
2
1999
45
32
35
5
19
4
2000
40
19
3
10
24
5
Totals
204
57
99
19
69
11
*This figure from the ICRC is particularly worrying: In October 1998 a mine detonated under a wedding
bus. Of the 79 casualties at least 35 of the injured were treated at ICRC in Kandahar but are unreported
in ICRC’s own interview data.
HI’s victim data is, in theory, the most systematic collection base for the provinces in which it works.
Using the 1150 community based MCs created in 41 districts (5 provinces) it collects information on a
monthly basis through these permanent village volunteers. A system that could be comprehensive and
sustainable. The limitations are that HI does not have mine committees in all villages and have
expanded to new provinces at different times and therefore for some provinces ( e.g. Ghazni and Farah)
their coverage is currently low (but continually expanding). This imbalance can be seen in the tables
No;5 below. Despite claiming to be committed to data gathering, changes in CBMAP management and
interagency disagreements over forms to be used has resulted in stops and starts in the collection of
data. Almost no data was collected in 2000. Additionally HI have approximately 4000 complete forms of
historical data concerning past accidents (prior to 1996) that have not been processed and remain in
files. It appears that the importance of collecting victim data is not always recognised by the Field
Officers and Supervisors of the project and there is little understanding in HI Afghanistan to the potential
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use of mine victim data as a strong planning tool for mine action in general. This is somewhat
surprising as HIB is very involved with the nation-wide victim database in Cambodia and have also
developed a national proposal for creating an Afghan national data-collection structure since early
2000.11
MAPA is the central agency that is responsible for collating any mine incident data received from the 3
agencies mentioned as well as any other source. MAPA freely admits that victim data is handled poorly,
but they are planning to improve their system in the future.
Findings for 1.4.1 Poor Data
 What this means is that MAPA (and its implementing partners including HI) have not realised, and
therefore have not set as a priority over the last 12 years of operations, the considerable power of
victim data as a planning tool to direct humanitarian mine action intervention. Neither have they or
other mine action agencies recognised the critical need to establish a baseline data in terms of
victim data in order monitor progress. The central aim of humanitarian mine action is, presumably,
the relief of the threat of mines for the population and not simply the clearance of land.
 From a national point of view it is clear that the collection of reliable data is in a very poor state and
the current dependency on national data from the ICRC is seriously flawed. Any quotations of
changes in injury/death levels in recent years in Afghanistan must therefore be resisted as there is
no method of substantiation. People are talking about a significant drop in casualty rates but there
is no reliable data to support this at the national level. A rigorous system needs to be put in place
as soon as possible along the lines of the HI proposal of 2000. Further discussion of this is beyond
the scope of this evaluation.

1.4.2 Constraints to finding correlations:
There are too many other factors that influence accident levels to isolate any particular mine action
intervention as being the key reason for decreases. In a similar assessment conducted in Cambodia in
2000 it was found that despite high concentrations of mine clearance, mine marking and mine
awareness interventions in some affected areas there were no correlations between accident rates and
mine action operations.12 This is a hard fact to swallow for those active in mine action as well as the
donors who would like to see a direct correlation between their investment and a decrease in mine/UXO
accidents.
An analysis of Handicap’s data from 4 provinces is shown below. Special focus has been given to data
concerning handling of mines and UXO as this is one type of behaviour / activity that mine awareness
particularly seeks to change

11

Afghanistan Mine Victim Information System (AMVIS) project proposal, as yet un-funded.
External Evaluation of Unicef-Supported Activitie to Prevent Mine Incidents (Horwood/Crossland
July 2000)
12
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Table No 5.

Selected analysis of HI Mine/UXO victim data

HELMAND
Province

Total
victims
reported

Number of victims
playing/tampering with
mine/UXO

% age of
total

Number of these
under 17 yrs old

% age of
playing/tamperin
g victims under
17 yrs

1996

96

62

64%

49

79%

1997

71

50

70%

38

76%

1998

41

17

41%

9

53%

1999

35

13

37%

6

46%

2000

3

2

66%

2

100%

KANDAHAR
Province

Total
victims
reported

Number of victims
playing/tampering with
mine/UXO

% age of
total

Number of these
under 17 yrs old

% age of
playing/tamperin
g victims under
17 yrs

1997

47

10

21%

7

70%

1998

119*

12

10%

5

55%

1999

45

25

56%

17

68%

2000

40

6

15%

3

50%

*one accident alone in Oct 1998 accounted for 79 of this figure . Without this accident the tampering
percentage in this year would have been 30 % instead of 7.5%.
ZABUL
Province

Total
victims
reported

Number of victims
playing/tampering with
mine/UXO

% age of
total

Number of these
under 17 yrs old

% age of
playing/tamperin
g victims under
17 yrs

1998

26

19

73%

9

47%

1999

19

7

37%

3

43%

2000

24

16

67%

13

81%

FARAH
Province

Total
victims
reported

Number of victims
playing/tampering with
mine/UXO

% age of
total

Number of these
under 17 yrs old

% age of
playing/tamperin
g victims under
17 yrs

2000

33

12

36%

11

92%

The ambiguity of the data:
The above analysis show a very high percentage of children (67% of all handling victims) involved in
deliberately touching mines and subsequently dying or being injured. These findings are significant and
strongly justify the ‘Don’t Touch’ message of mine awareness. However, the actual number of children
injured or killed by tampering playing has fallen from 49 children in Helmand alone in 1996, to 29
children in 4 provinces in the year 2000 (with only 2 children in Helmand in 2000).
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Interestingly the general trend continues when we look at the data from the first 3 months of 2001
from all 5 provinces: 45% of the 38 victims reported were injured or killed by handling/playing with
weapons. Of these 64 % were 17 yrs old or less.
Helmand statistics indicate a major drop in accident levels from mine and UXO from 96 reported victims
in ’96 to a low 3 in 2000 but this trend not seen in other provinces according to the CBMAP data.
Interestingly Kandahar has not seen a major change in victim levels since 1997 , however there has
been considerable mine awareness and clearance and mine marking in Kandahar in the last 5 years.
The problem with this sort of data is that some parts could be used as an indication of successful mine
action intervention (where HI’s contribution can be assumed to have made an impact), but other
sections of the data could be used as an illustration of the failure of mine action (including HI) to affect
victim levels.

Findings of 1.4.2 Constraints to finding correlations
 Data collection of mine and UXO victims in Afghanistan is poor and has been neglected for may
years. The low commitment to data collection is indicative of a lack of awareness of how important
this data is to prioritising and planning mine action intervention as well a providing a basis for
programme evaluation.
 HI have created the basis for a good data-collecting network in selected provinces but have not
processed the information consistently and have not prioritised this aspect of their work among their
staff. Nevertheless victim data has been reported by HI every month in their reports and submitted
to MAPA, despite MAPA’s repeated failure to manage and process this information in their own
reports or publications.13
 A correlation between CBMAP and changes in victim data can not be made. The available data is
ambiguous and because it lacks consistency no conclusions can be made. There is no statistical
evidence that accidents reduce where CBMAP operates. This does not, however mean that it is not
happening, just we can not show it statistically. If data is collected in areas where CBMAP do not
operate (and which are mine/UXO affected) it may be possible to illustrate, in future years, that the
impact of CBMAP reduces accidents. At this stage it is impossible.
 Even where reliable data-bases of victims exist (only Cambodia at present14) there is no
substantiated evidence that mine awareness or any activity of mine action directly leads to mine
accident reductions. In a post-conflict and rehabilitation situation there are simply too many other
factors that account for these changes and mine action activities can rarely be isolated as the main
causal factor of change.

1.5
Capacity and motivation assessment of direct and indirect mine awareness
trainers.
1.5.1

Nomaindas (direct training)

Nomaindas are direct employees of CBMAP. There are currently 38 Nomaindas working in the 41
districts of the five provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Farah and Ghazni. They are directly
monitored by provincial supervisors (2 per province) and indirectly managed from each provincial office
by Field Officers (4 to cover the 5 provinces).. They are recruited in the districts where CBMAP decided
13

When questioned on this, MAPA claimed that their regional offices did respond to victim data when
available by prioritising high risk areas for mine action intervention…
14
Also Kosovo but under very unique circumstances
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to work and take responsibility for their own district . Nomaindas are tasked to conduct direct training in
mine affected villages in their designated district. There medium term aim is to give direct training at
least once to all villagers as well as kuchi and IDPs in their districts. In addition to this to create a
sustainable basis for mine awareness in the communities they have to recruit, create, train, support and
monitor volunteers mine committees where ever they can. In reality this means at least one per village
although some villages have more. Furthermore they are required to regularly collect information from
the MCs, fill in forms and return these to the supervisors and through the HI system to the Kandahar coordination office.
Nomainda capacity.
The capacity of the Nomaindas appears to be considerable, and their role in the successful
implementation of CBMAP is central. They are given a high level of independence but have
considerable demands placed upon them. They are expected to perform at least 2 direct trainings each
day as well as compile various reports (i.e. 3 tasks per day). On average the Nomaindas in the 3
provinces of Kandahar, Zabul and Helmand supervise between 50-60 mine committees each. Some
Nomaindas have created up to 110 MC. The new Nomaindas in Ghazni and Farah are still creating
MCs. The current co-ordinator of the programme suggests that 65 should be the maximum number of
MCs under any Nomainda.
Since 1996 the Nomaindas have trained approximately 545,000 villagers and Kuchi in mine awareness
through their direct, one-off training approach. In addition they have created, trained and supported
1150 functioning MCs. Every month these totals are increasing and of course with the people the MCs
themselves train, it means that this pyramid of training provides mine awareness to a large proportion of
the rural population in these provinces.
All Nomaindas are literate and extremely familiar with the core mine awareness messages and the HI
curriculum. They use participatory methods in their trainings and are all equipped with mine models.
They sometimes use victims’ stories and tape recordings of the BBC drama ‘New Home, New Life’ in
their training. The presentations seen during the evaluation followed a format, covered all the issues
and appeared to capture the attention of those listening for the duration of the training. The training of
Nomaindas is centralised and curriculum-based which results in a standardised approach and minimal
deviation.
The Nomaindas are also responsible for the collection of village based data from the MCs on a monthly
basis. This includes victim data, ammunitions reports and more recently minefield reports, apart from
the normal reporting of MCs training details. To date the Nomaindas and MCs have generated 2653
ammunition reports which are sent to the regional MAPA office in Kandahar so that EOD teams of
another NGO (MCPA) can respond to these village requests for clearance. They have also collected
over 4000 ‘historical’ mine victim data forms while regularly submitting accident information (current total
almost 800 individual cases.)
Nomainda motivation:
Nomaindas are paid staff and presumable their key motivation is to maintain their position in HI at
difficult economic period for most rural Afghans. This evaluation was not able to judge whether religious
or humanitarian (or other) motivation led Nomaindas to work for HI. Nevertheless they are not highly
paid and they have many demands placed on them. This evaluation was very impressed with the high
output of CBMAP considering the harsh weather condition and distances covered by the Nomaindas
and the various responsibilities placed upon them. Their role and dedication is central to the whole
CBMAP structure, which appears to be very productive in terms of collecting data, creating MCs and
continue direct training.
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Mine committees (indirect training):

The title ‘mine committee’ can be misleading as the MC normally consists of one man. As of March
2001, HI list 1356 MC in total, of which 1150 are the mine committee leaders and the remaining 206
(voluntary) assistants.
MC Capacity:
The findings of this evaluation indicate that the capacity of the MCs to train (through re-fresher training
and in some cases direct training) is considerable . According to the CBMAP selection criteria the MC
has to be a respected member of the community, must live in the community and should be literate and
entirely appropriate to their section of their community. They are all volunteers and are in no way
enticed or compelled to be MC by HI or the Nomaindas.
MCs are given 10 hours training by the Nomaindas after the Nomainda has given direct training
sessions to the villages with the aim of giving most villages a one-time training exposure. The MC is
then created to continue this training from then on. An MC only starts to function after he is certified by
the provincial supervisors after passing a test and receiving a small kit consisting of mine models, a
blackboard, notebooks and in most cases a small radio. The Nomaindas (and sometime supervisors)
monitor the MCs regularly at least once a month and initially 2 times a month. At least once a month the
Nomaindas are expected to collect data from the MC under their jurisdiction and this visit provided an
opportunity for the Nomaindas to encourage and monitor the work of the MC
The evaluation found that of the 60 MC questioned, on average, they gave training to children in their
village either on a weekly basis (12%), on a two-weekly basis (35%) or on a monthly (45%) basis. They
also gave separate training to adults on a weekly basis (12%), on a two-weekly basis (25%) or on a
monthly basis (57%). As an average they divided their time between children and adults with 68% of
their time to children, and 32% to adults.
Almost all (95% ) of the MCs interviewed claimed that they were able to reach the whole of the village
through their trainings. This was not substantiated by the findings of group interviews in the case
studies. In the case studies, which mostly took place in villages where MCs were active, it was not
unusual for members of the village to say they had not ever attending trainings (informal or formal) by
the MCs even when the MC may have been operational for some years. Clearly there are limitations to
the capacity of the MCs in this regard. Some villagers are large with various mosques (community
centres) and despite there being more than one MC in the village they do not make contact with the
entire community . The informal nature of the MC and his frequent use of a single mosque or madressa
as the venue for his training means that those outside of that mosque of madrassa will probably not
have exposure to mine awareness from the MC concerned. The questionnaire results showed that 43%
of the MCs train informally, 40% do so formally (schools, madrassas and mosques)while 17% use both
approaches. This reality needs to be considered more seriously by the CBMAP, and closer supervision
of the larger villages may be necessary by the Nomaindas and provincial supervisors.
The wide (and increasing) network of MCs does enable a large number of people to hear mine
awareness training on a regular basis. CBMAP has recorded a total of 699,972 people trained by MC
(including those attending the radio forum organised by MCs with radios) since 1996. In terms of
volunteer capacity this is a very high number.15 As the programme is consolidated in the province where
they started earliest we should expect to see a drop in attendance levels of ‘new’ trainees and a rise in
the number of refresher trainings for ‘old’ trainees. For this reason it would be wrong in coming years to
assess the success of the activities of CBMAP by the number of people that attend their trainings. The
situation is very different for other mine awareness agencies that emphasis the one-off training
15

It may be added that HI have recorded their attendance figure for training quite conservatively,
recognising that in many training sessions some people will have already attended previous trainings.
As of March 2001 they require the MC to record ‘new’ and ‘old’ attendees separately.
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approach. For them numbers of attendees will remain a central tool to measure their progress, (despite
the fact that these sorts of measurements do not take into account the quality of the training).
MC Motivation:
The findings from the 60 MCs questioned for the evaluation indicate that they have a strong religious
and social (humanitarian) motivation for offering their services as a village volunteer. 98% indicated that
they would continue to act as the mine committee even if the Nomaindas (i.e. CBMAP) stopped to
support them or visit them. This is a very positive finding in regard to appropriateness and sustainability
of the position of MCs in the communities.(more discussion of this can be found in section 2.4 )
Another indication of the motivation, and sustainability of the MCs is the extremely low level of
discontinued MCs. Only 81 of the total number of MCs created since 1996 have stopped working,
representing only 6% of the total. Considering they work as volunteers this is impressive.
It has been suggested that part of the attraction and motivation of the MCs is that the peace-time fight
against the scourge of mines/UXO is considered jihad (holy war) and for this reason the recruitment of
MCs is much easier than recruiting health volunteers, for example. However, all MCs interviewed were
asked if they would be willing to collected information on a volunteer basis on other issues (such as
health, which could assist health NGOs) and the response was 95% positive. Already HI uses its
extensive network of MCs to collect data on mine victims, minefields and ammunition reports. The
potential benefits of such a network could be considerable . This will be discussed later in the report.

1.5.3

Training of IDPs / returnees and nomads (kuchi):

The CBMAP identifies IDPs, returnees and Kuchi as particular target groups in all of the projects’ 5
provinces and are reported separately from villagers in HI documentation. They are considered more
vulnerable to mines and UXO by the mine action community due to their lifestyles or changes in
situations.
Although in villages mine committees may train known ‘newcomers’ or returnees (often Afghan villagers
returning from years in Pakistan or Iran) and may also give training to passing kuchies, it is mainly the
task of the Nomaindas to meet these needs. Nomaindas are required to give training to identified
groups of IDPs and to kuchi groups as they arrive and camp in their areas of jurisdiction. On occasions
outside agencies with contact HI directly or through the regional mine action centre (RMAC) to request
mine awareness training in particular IDP camps. IDP from the drought (and some continued violence in
the north) can be found in western and southern Afghanistan. 16
CBMAP have been reporting their direct training of IDPs since early 2000. Between early 2000 and
April 2001 in Farah, Kandahar and Helmand , approximately 2596 IDPs have been given direct training
in mine awareness. As it is not clear how many IDPs there are in total in these specific area it is hard to
evaluate the coverage of Handicaps contribution in this area. This total represents only 1.2% of
CBMAP’s overall training (direct only) during the same period. According to HI data , as of March 2001,
8 mine committees had been created among IDPs.
HI has only recently started documenting the training given to ‘returnees’. Since September 2000 they
have given training to 559 persons in this category.
Nomaindas also give direct training to the kuchi. The questionnaire results indicated that many of the
MC also give informal training to kuchi but this is not recorded separately. It is not clear if the number of
kuchi the MCs train are included in the MC figures. 41% of all the Nomaindas trainees are kuchi, over
221,000 have been trained since 1996. This figure represents only 18% of the total number of people
16

HI are currently in discussions with RMAC in Heart and Kandahar concerning the training of IDP
camp volunteers there.
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trained by CBMAP during the last 5 years. It is hard to estimate the current number of kuchi in
Afghanistan. A working estimate from the United Nations suggests there are approximately 800,000.
HI assume that due to the difficulty of tracking different kuchi groups many kuchi may have received
double or triple training over recent years as they move from district to district and have contact with
different Nomaindas. There are only 7 MCs in kuchi groups. This situation needs to be re-considered by
HI as the volunteers representative system has a range of benefits to the people as well as HI and the
lack of MCs among the kuchi is a missed opportunity on both sides17. Apart from this the kuchi are
extremely vulnerable to mines and UXO during their travels and HI needs to find a way to maximise
mine awareness in their communities.

1.5.4

Current and future capacity:

Handicap’s CBMA structure take time and resources to set up , but once it is functioning it has a
immense capacity to deliver mine awareness to an ever increasing number of affected communities.
Due to ‘economies of scale’ and the capacity of the Nomaindas to create and monitor large numbers of
mine committees, the CBMAP can continue to offer its benefits to an increasing number of people at a
decreasing cost per capita ( i.e. person trained).
An example of the productivity of the programme as it stands at the moment is to take an extract from
the latest quarterly report (Jan-March 2001)
• 104,607 people were trained in mine awareness (direct and indirect)
• The Nomaindas visited a total of 321 new villages in the 5 provinces.
• 770 radio forums were held by the mine committees.
• 44 new mine committees were recruited, trained and created during this quarter.
• 46 mine victim casualty reports were completed and submitted from the project areas.
• 363 new ammunition reports were completed and submitted by mine committees .
The CBMAP operates with the same team of 38 Nomaindas, 10 supervisors and 4 Field Officers but
due to the expanding number of volunteer mine committees their productivity increases and
considerable ‘economies of scale’ are possible.

Limitations to growth & measurement of growth (progress indicators):
It is important to understand that despite the high ‘productivity’ evident in the CBMAP it would be a
mistake to expect this to continue and a mistake to judge the success of the programme by ‘production
figure’ such as those listed above.
As HI continues to expand into new areas (such as in Farah and now Ghazni) the numbers will continue
to increase in terms of new MCs, new trainees, radio forums etc. However, there is a limitation to this
growth. When Nomaindas have given direct training to everyone in their project areas and when they
have created all the required MCs they will need to focus more on support and monitoring; Their new
training figures will drop dramatically. Equally as the MC train all their villagers in mine awareness and
then continue with refresher training and reiteration HI cannot record these trainings in the same way
that they currently record ‘new’ training. Also with ammunition reports. There will be a finite limit to how
many reports a village will generate just as there is with minefields, and it should be expected that after
some time less and less ammunition report will be submitted. (This will be a positive sign in an area
where submission of reports has been active as will indicate that most UXO have been identified and
will soon be demolished, thereby making the villages UXO –free for ever.)
The overall ‘production’ figures will therefore fall as the programme consolidates its position . Clearly
victim data reporting will continue and training report from the village mine committees will continue but
17

Reliable kuchi victim data, ammunitions reports and a sustainable mine awareness network among
this vulnerable group are all missed by just offering direct training to kuchi and not developing a
volunteer representative option.
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the role of the HI staff will become one of maintaining and supporting the large number of village
volunteers. HI staff both in Afghanistan and HQ , MAPA authorities as well as donors need to be aware
of this so that expectations of the project are realistic. Reduced output figures will by no means indicate
a demise in the effectiveness of the project. On the contrary it could indicate a consolidation and
increased level of effectiveness among the affected populations.
Concerning measurement of progress, over time, the CBMAP should focus more on changes of
behaviour and quality of ‘mine smart’ knowledge in all target areas. In mine awareness the quality of
training and the effective use of the training by the villagers is as important as the quantity measured in
terms of coverage and trainees. The former is far harder to measure and will present HI staff with a
significant challenge. This external evaluation has gone some way to indicate the quality of the
programme in different areas but this function needs to be internalised in CBMAP and become part of
their own monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
The case studies in particular revealed gaps and missed opportunities in some of the target villages,
that the statistics and high ‘production’ figures can easily hide. The case studies and some results of the
questionnaires raise some central questions that need to asked of the programme managers and coordinators. See section 1.8 for more details.
Findings for all 1.5: Capacity and motivation assessment of direct and indirect mine awareness
trainers.
⇒ The Nomainda –based system is highly effective at developing a pyramidal structure with fast
expansion capacity for information gathering as well as mine awareness dissemination.
⇒ Nomaindas perform a central task in the CBMAP under difficult conditions. Their determination and
continuity should be commended.
⇒ The selection and recruitment of MCs appears to be appropriate and the concept of using only
village volunteers is a central aspect of HI's concept in CBMAP.
⇒ The ability of MCs to reach all members of their community must not be exaggerated. It is clear this
is not the case and remedial attention is required by HI to address this deficiency.
⇒ The motivation of MCs is primarily religious and humanitarian. Afghanistan may be a unique
context in which a system of this nature can flourish. Possibly not replicable in other countries.
⇒ The effectiveness of this 'information transfer system' could be harnesses for other humanitarian
concerns outside of mines.
⇒ His failure to develop a different structure to address the issue of meeting the needs of the Kuchi
represents a lost opportunity and should be corrected .
⇒ The potential for expansion of the HI system is considerable.
⇒ HI's role in their current 5 provinces will change over time as they consolidate the programme:
'prodution' figures will cease to be meaningful as a measure of the programmes' success and
dynamism.
⇒ Measure of the success of the programme needs to focus more on change of behaviour, increase
in mine smart knowledge and clear reduction in numbers of preventable accidents.

1.6

Community perceptions and expectations of mine awareness interventions.

Both in the case studies interviews and through the questionnaires villagers expressed a high level
interest and importance to mine awareness training. They were positive about the need and relevance
of mine awareness and strongly wished it to be continued . Almost none of those questioned expressed
indifference or tiredness concerning the trainings and a high percentage wanted the training to be
continued regularly in their villages.
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Statistically the results of the questionnaires were as follows:
In randomly selected villages evenly spread across the 38 districts where CBMAP operates, 629 people
were asked whether they thought their community needed to receive mine awareness training: 97% of
210 adults interviewed responded positively. 95% of 419 children interviewed responded positively.
Of these same interviewees only 5% of the adults and 5% of the children claimed they were tired of
hearing the mine awareness message. Concerning repetition (or reiteration), 96% of the adults and 95%
of the children felt mine awareness should be given repeatedly and not in one teaching lesson.
94% adults (of 210 interviewed) confirmed in a final question that mine awareness continued to be good
for their community.
Sixty mine committees were interviewed. Of these 96% confirmed that their villages wanted more mine
awareness training. Although 33% of the MCs said there were some people in their community who
were resistant to the mine awareness message they appear to represent a small minority in each village
Of 219 randomly selected kuchi adults and children questioned (in 38 different districts of the five
provinces) 95% responded that they felt mine awareness was necessary in their communities. Of these
just over half (58%) had had a visit and one-time training from a HI Nomainda or visiting MC at some
point. Despite the fact that CBMAP has almost no MCs in kuchi communities 73% of the 60 MCs
interviewed claimed that they visited kuchi communities from time to time. They confirmed that every
kuchi community that they visited was enthusiastic to receive mine awareness training.
This evaluation was surprised to find such a high level of interest and enthusiasm for mine awareness in
communities interviewed. In some cases the Nomaindas and MC have been operating for over 4 years
and it would not have been surprising for many to be somewhat indifferent to mine awareness training
and its continuation. In fact, for those communities where there have been high casualty levels and little
mine clearance or mine marking intervention it would not have been surprising to encounter resentment
towards mine awareness which is at best a preventative ‘public safety’ message and not a cure to the
problem. Instead the overwhelming attitude was one of support and recognising the relevance. HI
should take some credit that they have established a methodology and approach that is very acceptable
to the communities and which is taken seriously by the people. The semi-structured interviews (case
studies) with groups of villagers entirely corroborates the findings on these issues from the results of the
questionnaires.
Findings of 1.6 Community perceptions and expectations of mine awareness

interventions.
⇒ The perception of the vast majority of the communities where CBMAP operates is highly supportive
of the existence and continuation of mine awareness training. HI have clearly developed a
methodology and approach which is both acceptable and perceived as relevant to communities.
⇒ Communities indicate a strong desire for mine awareness to continue and with frequency. This
suggests that there is a strong basis for the sustainability of the programme.
⇒ That the kuchis have a high interest in receiving more mine awareness and due to their uniquely
vulnerable status in Afghanistan in relation to mines HI should put more emphasis into providing
kuchis with systematic mine awareness training in stead of the ad hoc visits by Nomaindas and
MCs.

1.7

HI/CBMAP as part of the overall Mine Acton Programme for Afghanistan(MAPA)

Although not part of the TOR for this evaluation, it is felt that CBMAP needs to be seen in the context of
the overall Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan co-ordinated by UNOCHA (Islamabad) and through
its 4 regional offices (a 5th to be created shortly in the north)
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Handicap has always voluntarily placed itself under the co-ordination of UNOCHA/ MAPA, although it
obtains all of its programme funding independently. This is part of HIs overall policy in mine action to
combine efforts, avoid duplication, share expertise and information with the wider mine action
community. The largest NGO conducting mine awareness within MAPA is OMAR, and other agencies
active in mine awareness include Save The Children-US, The Afghan Red Crescent Society, the BBCAfghan Education Programme, AMAA (Afghan Mine Awareness Agency) and ARI (Ansar Releif
Institute). Halo Trust and other clearance NGOs perform some mine awareness where they work but
not in a systematic of dedicated manner.
HI participates in national co-ordination meetings (quarterly) a well as monthly meetings held in
Kandahar by the Southern Regional Mine Action Centre. It submits progress reports to RMAC every
months as well as accident data and ammunitions reports collected by Nomaidas and mine committees.
Since early 2001 the CBMAP network is also staring to submit minefield information from villages
concerning minefields identified by villagers which are not included in the data base of MCPA- the
survey and marking agency within MAPA. The capacity of the CBMAP network to generate villagebased information (victim data, new minefields, ammunition reports) is an important added value in
addition to the mine awareness dissemination it performs.
In terms of mine awareness support and coordination HI receives little operational or methodological
benefit from being part of MAPA. Occasionally MAPA has assisted HI by advising another agency to
curtail duplication of mine awareness or practises that undermine the CBMAP approach in their areas.18
However the HI rural community based approach remains a progressive and innovative differs from
other mine awareness agencies in Afghanistan., although some are currently moving towards a
volunteer based system.19. It may be noted that in a recent planning document from the Plans and
Operations Manager of MAPA (April 2001) almost all the activities and plans that are suggested for
mine awareness agencies are based on the exact approach of CBMAP.
MAPA appear to be pleased with HI’s participation in data collection and mine awareness and are also
keen to see them develop and field the proposed EOD teams. In terms of international profile and
credibility with donors, MAPA’s accreditation of HI and the CBMAP and its participation in MAPA is a
benefit to HI. This evaluation strongly recommends the continuation of HI in MAPA and comments that
HI and its considerable success with CBMAP probably has a relatively low profile in Kabul and
Islamabad due to lack of representation and presence in those centres.
Victim Data and a national data collection proposal:
Issues concerning victim data collection in HI as well as nationally are discussed in detail in section 1.4.
As mentioned the national data generally is poor and unreliable, coming as it does from irregular and
incomplete sources. Furthermore MAPA management of data received from the 3 main agencies that
report to them has been very unsatisfactory. HI does have more systematic and regular network for
collecting information and is in a strong position to provide reliable information on the 5 provinces in
which it works. This system will only increase and improve as their coverage in provinces increases
(especially in Farah and Ghazni where they are still creating MCs). This evaluation suspects that apart
from some deficiencies already mentioned in section 1.4, the HI collection network probably misses a
considerable number of deaths and injuries sustained by kuchis. This evaluation will suggest
recommendations to remedy this.

18

During 1999 and 2000 there were cases where OMAR were conducting mine awareness in the same
villagers where HI had MCs and were in addition recruiting village representatives who received pay
for the first 3 months and then were required to become voluntary. Not surprisingly most stopped
working after 3 months. OMAR abandoned this approach.
19
Following a visit to the HI programme, in 1997 SCF-US began an effective volunteer system in
Kabul.

External Evaluation of HI Community-based Mine Awareness Programme (May 2001)

24

In early 2000 HI , following discussions with ICRC, WHO and MAPA put together a proposal to develop
a national system for mine victim information – AMVIS- Afghanistan Mine Victim Information System. As
of May 2001 no progress has been made to establish funding for this project . This evaluation considers
the development of a national data system for the accurate recording of mine and UXO victims to be
vital. That MAPA has operated for 12 years without any real idea of the number and circumstance of
victims is remarkable. Such data is not only vital to monitor the rise or fall of incidents in specific areas,
act as a baseline against which progress can be monitored, but is a powerful planning and prioritisation
tool for mine clearance, mine awareness and victim support services. HI have experience in Cambodia
where they run (with the Cambodian Red Cross) a national victim data system which provide monthly
reports with detailed analysis of changes and commune level location of accidents. This information is
used by the mine action community within Cambodia and outside. This evaluation does not promote any
particular agency to be the lead agency in a similar initiative in Afghanistan, but it does recommend
strongly that a system is established in Afghanistan without delay. Full support should be given to the
current proposal .
Ammunition Reports and new EOD initiatives:
The CBMAP network is also very effective in collecting information concerning ‘stray mines’ and UXO in
rural areas. Mine committees and Nomaindas are specially trained to complete forms that are then
passed onto RMAC (Kandahar). Since 1996 (up to March 2001) 2,653 ammunition reports have been
submitted to RMAC. They give this information to MCPA which is the only agency in the southern region
to have one mobile EOD team available to respond to these reports. A single team has been found to
be inadequate to meet the needs and HI lose moral and motivation to report when long delays occur
between the time of reporting and the time when the EOD team arrives to conduct the destruction of the
item reported. Data collected by HI in their project areas and reinforced by findings of there data from
other regions indicate that a disproportionately high number of children are being killed and injured by
tampering and playing with abandoned UXO.
For some years HI have requested MAPA for permission to set up their own EOD teams to respond to
the reports generated by their village volunteers and Nomaindas. Since 2000 MAPA have recognised
the need for an increase in designated EOD teams operating in different parts of Afghanistan and plans
have been approved for the establishment a number of new mobile EOD teams. ECHO has proposed
to fund this development. HI will be responsible (with MCAP’s existing team) for the southern region and
is currently planning the recruitment of staff and equipment for the setting up of 2 EOD teams. These
two mobile teams will be established by the end of 2001 and immediately work on the backlog of
ammunition reports that the MCPA team has been unable to address. This evaluation strongly supports
this development and expansion of HI’s operational profile in Afghanistan.

Findings of 1.7: HI/CBMAP as part of the overall Mine Acton Programme for

Afghanistan(MAPA)
⇒ Strategically and operationally it is important for HI to remain a participating member of MAPA
despite the fact that the programme has felt few direct benefits in terms of mine awareness
ideology or shared experience from other mine awareness agencies and MAPA itself.
⇒ That the volunteer network in many hundreds of villages in affected areas gives HI a high capacity
for valuable information transfer . This can be seen in the high levels of trainees as well as the
victim data information and ammunition report which are useful to MAPA.
⇒ That HI’s link through the RMAC with EOD teams in other agencies has enabled ammunition
reports to be addressed in the past. Due to the high number of requests generated there is a need
for more EOD teams and that HI’s plan to develop 2 new EOD teams in 2001 is commendable, if
not overdue.
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⇒ That despite the disappointing standard of victim data collection and processing nationally, HI is
establishing a solid basis and is well placed to improve the data collected in its regions
substantially. That it should continue to submit all victim data to MAPA as it tries to improve its
management of this data.In this regard HI should vigorously promote the establishment of the
national data collection plan as laid out in the AMVIS proposal written in 2000.

1.8

Towards project progress indicators.

The case studies in particular revealed gaps and missed opportunities in some of the target villages,
that the statistics and high ‘production’ figures can easily hide. The case studies and some results of the
questionnaires raise some central questions that need to asked of the programme managers and coordinators. Some key questions that need to become internalised and part of CBMAP regular monitoring
and evaluation include;
How is it that there are villagers who have not been trained after 4 years of Nomainda and MC trainings
in the village?
How do we reach every household in a village?
How do we measure the change of behaviour among villagers?
Why is it that in villages where mine awareness has been trained for years do children still play with
UXO?/ step on mines?
Is there a direct link between people becoming ‘mine smart’ through training and subsequent changes in
risk-taking behaviour?
As adult men are the most vulnerable group, are we sure the MC are really addressing their needs?
The kuchi are probably the most vulnerable group but have no volunteer representative structure; how
can CBMAP address their needs better?
How do we measure the quality of the programme and not the quantity of the activities?

2.0

Evaluation of Operations

2.1

Project structure and resources

The project structure is straight forward and uncomplicated: The CBMAP coordinators (one expat /one
national) co-ordinate the three levels of staff that consist of provincial field officers (4 for 5 provinces), 10
supervisors (2 per province) and the 38 Nomaindas. This structure is illustrated as annex B. For some
months the project has been co-ordinated by the national co-ordinator as HI Brussels has been
recruiting a new expatriate co-ordinator to head the team. This new co-ordinator will arrive in early June
2001.
Field Officers live at the provincial field offices in Farah city, (Farah), Ghazni city (Ghazni), Grishk
(Helmand), Qalat (Zabul) and Kandahar city (Kandahar). Each field office has a designated vehicle for
the programme. All Nomaindas and supervisors have motorbikes which are used extensively in their
daily work.
Findings of 2.1: Project structure and resources
⇒ This evaluation finds the management structure to be simple and effective, with a low level of paid
staff able to control a network that benefits 41 districts, thousands of villages and reaches hundreds
of thousands of people. The Nomaindas and supervisors should be commended for their dedication
in particularly difficult geographical and climatic conditions, having to traverse vast areas of the 41
districts they cover in Southern Afghanistan.
⇒ The current structure has considerable potential for further expansion in terms of reaching more
communities with mine awareness (creating more MCs) without increasing the number of paid staff.
The current co-ordinator feels that the number of MC could double (giving each Nomainda and
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average of 65 MC each) without increasing the staff number or structure. These ‘economies of
scale’ are a major benefit of the CBMAP design

2.2

Project coverage and selection mechanisms

The CBMAP is now working in five province. It started in Kandahar in 1996. In late 1997 it expanded to
Zabul, followed by Helmand in January of 1998. In February 2000 they started in Farah and this
January 2001 they began recruiting and training Nomaindas in Ghazni. CBMAP is currently covering the
southern part of Afghanistan as well as Farah in the south-west and Ghazni (which is considered a
central province.)
The selection of province has not only been based on highest priorities or needs assessments but on
logistical, administrative and political considerations as well. In addition to this ‘donor politics’ have
played a part. HI was already based in Kandahar in 1996 having run disability projects for some years. It
was a high priority province and expanding to other districts in Kandahar was a natural expansion
following some months of pilot activities in Dand district. Expansion between 1997-2000 into adjacent
provinces was an instinctive process in terms of logistics and communications, management and
proximity. HI did have the intention and donor commitment, to extend into Herat, considered extremely
high priority, in 2000. The Teleban blocked this and the result was Ghazni becoming the 5th province
within the CBMAP after consultations with MAPA who favoured Ghazni as opposed to Paktika (HI’s
original choice) . The various details of donor relations, internal and external politics with the Taleban,
MAPA and within HI are not important to this report, but illustrate the reality of NGO presence and
expansion often being a function of different pressures and considerations.
The last expatriate co-ordinator of CBMAP wrote a critical report concerning the lack of sufficient
justification for HI to chose new provinces without observing more rigorous selection criteria. This
evaluation finds that in the cut and thrust of ‘donor politics’, geographical, logistical and communications
constraints, the urgency to respond to a widespread but undocumented need (i.e. no real victim data)
create a situation where choices are as much pragmatic as they are idealistic. The issue of concern is
not that of province selection but of village selection within the high-risk districts that are selected by
CBMAP:The village selection is left up to the Nomaindas.
Of the 64 districts in the 5 provinces CBMAP has recruited Nomaindas to train villagers and create MCs
in 41 districts. These districts have been selected by CBMAP as most-affected and requiring mine
awareness intervention. The districts themselves are selected by using MAPAs minefield survey data
that illustrate where the most heavily mined areas are. A needs assessment survey is conducted in a
selection of villages in these districts to see how high the level of need is for mine awareness and the
level of interest of the population. HI staff also claim they consult NGOs and local authorities a part of
this process. Once the assessment has been analysed districts are selected, Nomaindas are recruited
and trained. Then they start to train the local people in their village and in surrounding villages. First by
foot and then after 3 months of trial period with a motorbike. The normal direct training visits and MCcreating pattern is of an ever widening ring of villages around the village where the Nomainda lives.
This is a weakness of the CBMAP programme as villages that need mine awareness may be missed
due to their location, accessibility or distance from the Nomaindas preferred areas of operations. When
adults in villagers (where CBMAP has not been operational and are not planning to be operational i.e in
Helmand , Zabul and Kandahar) were asked if they considered their village to be directly at risk from
landmines, 81% replied positively. This could indicate that the current system of allowing the Nomainda
themselves to select which villages they work in is flawed and that HI need to review and revise their
selection process within districts as soon as possible. To some extent HI already recognise this
weakness and in their newest province (Ghazni) the Field Officer is being tasked to monitor the target
areas chosen by the Nomaindas carefully and continue needs assessment analysis as an on-going
activity.
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In terms of coverage it is very difficult to establish how many villages there are in the project provinces/
districts. The Gazette, MCPA and Programme Management Information System (UN-PROMIS)
according to HI’s findings are grossly underestimating the number of actual villages in each district. HI is
currently requesting the project field staff to count the number of villages in the areas along with
numbers of households in each village, the village names and the number of mosques. Equally with
regard to total population residing in the 5 provinces there is no reliable data.

Findings of 2.2: Project coverage and selection mechanisms
⇒ This evaluation realises that this section is inconclusive and sheds little light on the scope of HI’s
coverage. Nevertheless it is clear that in the 5 provinces there are 38 Nomaindas working in the
most affected districts. Their duty is to give direct training throughout the district in mine affected
villages and kuchi camps. To what extent this is occurring cannot be measured at this stage except
by the considerable numbers of trainees in all locations and the establishment of large numbers of
MCs (over 1150) and visits made to at least 4,200 villages in the last 6 years.
⇒ As indicated there is a weakness in the selection system concerning villages within districts. HI
needs to have a more rigorous process of ensuring that other villagers that are not currently
included in the work of Nomainda and MC are not at risk. The questionnaire result appear to show
that many people living in such areas consider themselves at risk and in need of mine awareness.

2.3

Staff monitoring and training .

The MCs are monitored and encouraged though a minimum of once a month visits (sometimes more
frequent) by the Nomainda, occasionally accompanied by the supervisors. During these visits the
Nomainda helps the MCs to fill in forms and collect the information concerning his training , accident
data and any munitions reports. Nomainda are also required to make assessments (using prepared
forms) of the MCs from time to time. When the MC is created he receives approximately 10 hours of
one to one training from the Nomainda during a maximum period of 6 days. In 2000 HI gave three
refresher and form-filling training sessions to 50 MCs each time in the 3 provinces of Helmand,
Kandahar and Zabul. This year they hope to repeat the exercise but including many more of the MCs.
The Nomaindas are monitored by the 2 supervisors for each Province. They compile all the reports
coming from the villages through the Nomaindas and regularly visit the Nomaindas as they perform
direct training. The Nomaindas always leave a note on their house door saying where they are so that
the supervisors and field officer can always locate them. There are no electronic or telephonic forms of
communication between the provincial office and the Nomaindas and/or MC. Supervisors are also
required to make assessments (using prepared forms) of the Nomaindas from time to time.
The supervisors and Nomaindas are co-ordinated and managed at the provincial level by the Field
Officers and all three levels are given training in Kandahar every 3 month by the co-ordinator himself. At
these training sessions a general internal evaluation is made of the progress made, problems
encountered and new ideas are discussed.
In the new proposal to cover the period from June 2001 into the future a ‘Training Cell’ has been
planned which will consist of 2 trainers tasked to monitor and training the supervisors and Nomainda in
the field.

Findings of 2.3: Staff monitoring and training
⇒ The current structure of monitoring and training appear to be working well and meeting the needs of
different levels of management. The frequent 3-monthly training for Field Officers, Supervisors and
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Nomainda is judged to be very positive in terms of keeping a close control of standards, monitoring
problems as they arise and developing a strong team spirit.
⇒ This evaluation found that more control was needed concerning the understanding by field staff of
the importance of coverage and village selection. This is discussed in more detail above in section
2.2.

2.4

Status & function of the Mine Committee

2.4.1 The social origin and function of the MC and its influence upon its motivation, impact
and credibility.
Between April 1996 and March 2001 (5 years) HI has created 1228 Mine Committees of which 1150
are currently active. Some of the MCs have assistants bring the total of currently-supported mine
awareness volunteers to over 1300 in five provinces. These village volunteers have been created as HI
has expanded from Kandahar, to Zabul and Helmand and more recently to Farah and Ghazni. In these
last two provinces new MCs are being created on a regular basis based on the province’s needs
assessment (conducted by HI prior to entry into the province) and as part of the duties of the local
Nomaindas. In the provinces where HI has been operating for some years new MCs are created only
when mine-risk villages that still do not have MCs come to the notice of the Nomaindas and the
provincial supervisors.
Of the current MCs supported by the programme approximately 35% are local farmers. 38% are either
mullahs or student mullahs (talebs) and 14% are teachers in the local madrasas or schools while 5%
are local health workers. The final 8% are tailors, drivers, jobless or shopkeepers. Only 2 of all the MCs
are headman / leaders of their communities. Nomaindas who are responsible for the creation of new
MCs are aware that they have to select members of the community that have a good level of respect
and of course MCs are only created in villages where they community show both an interest and desire
for mine awareness. Clearly MCs share the same origins as other community members and live within
the village.20 The social status of the MCs, as illustrated above, indicate that most of the MCs are
respected community members. Those familiar with Islamic societies will understand the immense
importance of the mullah, as well as school teachers, in rural communities.
The evaluation found that almost all MC interviewed (sample size of 60) themselves considered that
they were able to reach all members of their community with mine awareness messages. During the
case studies it appeared that the MC was always respected, mine awareness training valued and his
ability to reach all members of the community was normally a function of the physical size of the village
or the newness of the MC in the community.
Among the Kuchi there are only 5 active MCs . Almost all training of Kuchi (which in terms of trained
persons accounts for 40% of all direct training) is conducted by Nomaindas who do not come from the
Kuchi communities. It should be noted that although the lifestyles of settled villagers and Kuchies differ
considerably their common ethnic origins means a Nomainda can enter a Kuchie encampment and
enjoy the hospitality and respect of the people during the training period. 21 Nevertheless considering
that the Kuchi groups are especially vulnerable to mines and UXO this evaluation suggests that greater
efforts are made to establish volunteer representatives within Kuchi groups. Perhaps a different

20

During one of the case studies (No: XX) a young hazari (ethnic group within Afghanistan) man was
interviewed as the MC for a small community of hazaris within a larger rural community.
21
Pastoral nomadism in Afghanistan is highly dynamic in terms of the nomadic life being a choice
based on economic and climatic opportunity. A nomadic community this decade could switch to a
settled existence in another decade. However it is also true that many settled, and especially urban
Afghan group have a pejorative view of the Kuchies.
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methodology has to be found for them and a different support structure, but currently the HI structure
favours settled communities although the evidence suggests Kuchies are exposed to higher risk.
All MCs are male. This is a function of the social and cultural realities (which may be seen as
‘constraints’ ) in Afghanistan. Despite this and the fact that woman have severely limited access to mine
awareness training the Nomaindas and MC are able train a significant number of women and girls. This
is discussed in section 1.2.2 of this report.
Currently HI appears to not be pressurising Nomaindas (and their provincial Field Officers) to create
new MC in order to meet targets or to impress superiors with ‘output’ levels. There may, however, have
been some element of this in earlier years when HI was keen to establish its programme with wide
coverage. Nevertheless the MCs are volunteers who receive no incentives of any kind other than a
functional training kit and in many cases a small radio (worth less than $4 USA). The evaluation found
that the primary motivation of the MC was a combination of Islamic faith and duty combined with a
humanitarian desire to save their fellow villagers from the dangers of mines. HI’s own experience over
the years indicates that many of the MCs consider that the struggle against mines is still part of the
jihad, (holy war) and participation is a particular honour for any Muslim.22
Over the last 5 years only 6% of the MCs created have decided to relinquish their role after agreeing to
acting as volunteers23. This indicates a high degree of stability among the volunteers many of whom
have been working for at least 2 years and others up to 4 or 5 years as volunteers. The others appear to
be actively giving their communities training and reporting munitions and other data to the HI
Nomaindas .If MCs had been created merely to meet quotas or raise statistics we could expect to see a
high number of defunct or inactive MC. According to HI’s monitoring information and data collection this
is not the case. Due to the considerable hardship caused by the drought in the last 2 years some MCs
have recently gone to Pakistan (c.20).

Findings of 2.4.1 Status & function of the Mine Committee
⇒ The social status of the Mine Committees appears to be appropriate to the task in so far that they
operate within social groups of which they themselves are part.
⇒ The fact that the community themselves indicate to the Nomaindas whether they want a MC
operating in their village, and that the MC himself volunteers knowing there are no incentives
(except the honour), is a good measure of the willingness of villages to participate in HI’s mine
awareness network.
⇒ The fact that the majority of the MC volunteers are respected members of their communities
indicates that mine awareness training as developed through this programme is taken seriously by
community leaders which in turn guarantees a high level of attendance by villagers at indirect
training sessions.
⇒ Considering the social and cultural context of Afghanistan this evaluation finds that the current
system of MC recruitment and support works well and is appropriate for settled communities. The
current system with respect to Kuchies appears to be weak with only 5 active MC in these
communities. If the existing recruitment and support structure for MC is not appropriate for Kuchies
and alternative needs to be found as soon as possible.
22

As such it was suggested that the MCs would not be interested in acting as village volunteers on
other issues, but the results of the questionnaires found that most were very willing to assist the
community and NGOs in other way and with other data. This is discussed in section XXX.
23
Some of these ex-MCs were located during the evaluation and interviewed. Most left after serving
their community as the MC for over a year and all left for personal or work-related reasons.
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2.4.2 Determine the proportion between formal and informal training given by MC and assess
the efficiency of both methods.
The MC Questionnaire asked a sample selection of 60 MCs to differentiate between informal and formal
trainings that they gave. 43% said they gave formal training. 40% said they gave informal training and
17% said they gave both. These results are of limited use as it was impossible to subsequently test
villagers knowledge and/or behavioural change in relation to mines and draw any conclusions
concerning the efficiency. The case study interviews appears to support the reality that in fact most MCs
use both informal and formal training approaches.
Afghan village culture involves a high level of social gatherings (tea-drinking) and
conversation/discussion (in homes and around the mosques). Inevitable the MC will discuss mines with
villagers in these sort of situations. This is one of the strengths of the MC structure in so far that the
issue of mines and UXO can be kept alive and training occurring in an informal and continuous way. To
try to separate the informal and formal training approach would be a difficult and questionable analytical
exercise. However it is the conviction of this evaluation that both methods are inevitably used by MCs
and are the basis for the mine awareness message being sustainable and repeated within the village
context.

2.5

Materials and Methodlogies

The Taleban regime have implemented rules concerning television, video, games, puppets and any
photo image or realistic representation of the human form. These rules considerably restrict the scope
of materials available to mine awareness trainer in Afghanistan. The CBMAP has always operated
under these restrictions and use a simple range of tools and props to promote mine awareness.
Nomaindas and mine committees use the same simple kit. They have a number of wooden mine and
UXO model that are either loose or stuck into a wooden close-able case. They also have a range of 3
different A4 size flyers with some warning messages and images of mine and disabled people etc.
These item have been used since 1996. They also have a collection of stories about mine victims or
mine-related stories that are used to stimulate discussion and group story-telling during training
meetings. New stories are added to the collection every year. Nomaindas have tape recorders with
taped mine awareness messages taken from the BBC drama series. These they use during their direct
trainings. Just over 700 mine committee have been given small radios with which they are encouraged
to hold Radio Forums, inviting people to listen to the BBC drama and then generate some discussion
about mines and a pretext for the MC to mention some of the essential mine awareness messages.
The tools, radios, mine models and flyers are all designed to reinforce the basic 8 messages of mine
awareness that is the core of the CBMAP curriculum. This curriculum was developed in 1996/7 and has
been upgraded over the years but essentially the message are the same. Teaching first aid messages
to children has stopped but otherwise the methodology and materials remain the same. Nomainda are
required to adhere to the 8 messages very closely and to teach the MCs to do the same.
The current co-ordinator hopes to develop some new images on silk screens and renew the flyers in the
next programme cycle (post-June 2001). An evaluation of the tools and methodologies used by HI
Afghanistan (and other HI programmes) was made by the mine awareness officer from HI Lyon last
year. The office in Kandahar still awaits the report.
Radios and radio forums:
For some years the BBC have been broadcasting (in Pushtoon and Farsi)a radio drama (on-going
‘soap’ style) called New ‘Home New Life’ that has important public health messages expressed through
the drama. Mine awareness is a main theme for the drama and the show is broadcast four times a week
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with a new story two times a week: 8 episodes a month . They reinforce their message by making
booklets for NGOs and Afghans to use to reiterate the messages. Handicap has been working closely
with BBC developing the theme for mine awareness broadcasts and the accompanying booklet.
The drama series have been a great success with the rural population. The CIET national mine
awareness evaluation of 1998 found this to be the case, BBC's own frequent research show this and
the result of this study also confirm the fact. In the case studies groups of villagers often spoke highly of
the radio drama and seemed very familiar with the characters and events in the show. The
questionnaire results indicated that of the 1113 people interviewed 48% listen or had listened to the
drama. 46% considered that they understood the messages in the show and that people learned from
the drama. The highest group of listeners were in those villages where CBMAP operates with 80% of
the adults and 63 % children listening to the drama. About half of these had listened to the drama with
the MC in radio forums at some point.
This evaluation considers the BBC drama to be an excellent tool that they should take full advantage of
in terms of encouraging their MC and Nomaindas to promote the drama. Currently HI have a problem
with the radios they first purchased and distributed to 785 mine committees. They purchased small and
cheap Chinese radios(c$3 US) that are too small for large groups, have poor reception and are not at all
sturdy. Many are broken and unusable. This evaluation suggests that buying cheap radios is a false
economy and that in the future better quality radios should be purchased and that radio distribution
should be seen as an essential tool of all mine committees. A policy needs to be considered concerning
the issue of battery provision by HI (versus the community providing their own batteries as their
participation).
Since the introduction of radio forums as part of the MCs activities in January 2000 over 63,000 people
have had mine awareness training through the radio forums and the subsequent discussions and
teachings that it generates. Far more people listen to the drama on their own. The potential to harness
the high popularity of the show is considerable and HI should make this a priority.

Findings of 2.5 Materials and Methodologies
⇒ Considering the restrictions set by the Taleban, the current tools, materials and methodologies
appear to serve the training staff well. Those exposed to mine awareness through this approach
appear to be more ‘mine smart’ than those not exposed to training, but direct correlations with ‘mine
smart’ knowledge and incident reduction can still not be made.
⇒ This evaluation considers the BBC drama to be an excellent tool that they should take full
advantage of in terms of encouraging their MC and Nomaindas to promote the drama. Its popularity
is proven and due to HI’s involvement with BBC they are in a strong position to help guide the
producers concerning the content of the broadcasts.
⇒ Buying cheap radios is a false economy and that in the future better quality radios should be
purchased and that radio distribution should be seen as an essential tool of all mine committees

2.6

Community Involvement

The involvement of the community in CBMAP operations should not be exaggerated and neither should
there be unrealistic expectations. CBMAP is essentially an information transfer system that enables the
communities to benefit from mine awareness and other mine action intervention (EOD, marking,
prioritised clearance, victim rehabilitation..) and which enables the concerned external agencies
understand and react to the mine problem more effectively. The community participate through
recognition of the problem they face in respect to mines and UXO and their co-operation with the
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volunteer representative (MC), through attending mine awareness training, and the reporting to the MC
of any information concerning victim data, minefields and UXO sightings.
Not surprisingly communities are very positive about any mine action intervention and generally the
CBMAP has met with high co-operation from all communities it has visited in the last 5 years. Provincial
and district authorities have also been very positive about the programme. Beyond this there are no
tangible issue where the community can be more active in terms of participation except in the obvious
area of changing behaviour (to minimise risk ) following the mine awareness training,

2.7

Technical assistance requirements

The programme appear to be operating very well as it is currently run by the Afghan co-ordinator and
his staff, overseen by the Country Director. There has been a gap of 4 months since the last expat coordinator of the CBMAP left the programme. The programme has had 5 different expatriate coordinators in 5 years. This is a relatively high turn over which damages project continuity and followthrough of new initiatives.
A new expatriate co-ordinator has been recruited and is due to start working in the programme in June
2001. It is hoped that he is a specialist in either education, training and/or communications. This is the
technical profile required of those co-ordinating mine awareness programme. Previous mine related
experience is less important and can be learnt in-country. Previous military experience is neither
necessary nor appropriate.

3.0

Evaluation of Sustainability

This report considers the CBMAP to have established an conceptual approach and operational structure
that allows mine awareness to be highly sustainable in a target area and population group of
considerable size. This is already being achieve with increasing economies of scale a the project
currently expands in Ghazni and Farah, while consolidating in Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar. The
programme is culturally and socially appropriate in design and its structure allows a single community
based Nomainda to monitor and interface with a large number of MCs. Mine awareness seeks to reduce
dangerous and risk-taking practises through the teaching of ‘mine smart’ knowledge: as long as there
are mines and UXO this is a damage limitation exercise and not a damage control exercise. There will
never be the perfect mine awareness programme but a community based, voluntary and self-sustaining
network of trainer and information collectors is a significant achievement that deserves recognition.
Considering the different aspects of sustainability and the specific evaluation requirements set out in the
TOR the following subject will be briefly examined.

3.1

MC coverage and MC reputation:

There may be problems concerning the MC coverage of their communities. In many of the case studies
(which were normally conducted in communities where there were functioning MCs) those interviewed
in the ‘semi-structured interviews’ did not know who exactly the mine committee and neither had they
received training from them. In the villages where MC exist and where questionnaires were conducted it
is true that 88% of adults and 81% of children confirmed that they had received some mine awareness
training. A weakness in the questionnaire design does not enable us to identify whether this training was
given by the district Nomainda or by the mine committee.
Due to the informal training methods of the MC, (as opposed to the formal approach of the Nomaindas
who furthermore arrive in the village on motorbikes) the fact that he almost certainly does not describe
himself as a ‘mine committee,’ and the fact that he may already be known as the mullah, or teacher or
as the respected shop-keeper, the other villagers may not identify the MC to outsiders successfully.
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They may not even describe the way the MC trains them as ‘training’ when asked in a formal
questionnaire. This does not mean the MC is not doing his training effectively and that the knowledge of
mine awareness is not gradually spreading throughout the village. The uncertainty here is more a
reflection on the limitations of the evaluation and questionnaire techniques than evidence that MCs do
not reach a large number of there communities.
Nevertheless, some village are large and MCs will operate in their section of the village and normally
use the mosque which they frequent (and its associated madrasa or school) as the venues for most
‘training’. This automatically limits the scope of coverage for each MC and is why CBMAP has more
than one MC in many villages. If the documented statistics from HI are accurate they indicate that on
average each MC has given indirect training to over 600 people. This appears to be a very high
average, which suggests that some degree of double-counting may taking place. However when this
average figure is divided by the number of years of programme operation and months the resulting
monthly average is only 10 people per MC. That MC, on average train 10 people a month is entirely
believable.24

Findings of 3.1 MC coverage and MC reputation
⇒ Generally this evaluation finds that the supervisors and Nomaindas need to monitor MCs more
carefully to ensure that where there are sections of the community or village where the MC cannot
train, they consider creating new MCs.25 Achieving maximum coverage is important.
⇒ It is noted that villagers appear to associate their memory of receiving mine awareness training
much more with the visit of the Nomainda that the informal training of the MCs. This does not
necessarily indicate that the MCs are less successful. CBMAP will needs to look into these issues
in more detail (through questioning villages and selected case studies) if a deeper analysis is
needed.
⇒ Issues concerning coverage and reputation of the MC are directly related to the sustainability and
the efficiency of the programme.

3.2
Assess monitoring requirements to supervise MA delivered by Mine
Committees.
The CBMAP ha developed various forms and mechanisms to monitor and test different issue and staff
within the project including the MCs. For example they use;
• Training Observation Forms (for Field Officers and Supervisors to monitor training given my
Nomaindas and MCs)
• Mine Committee Test and Evaluation Forms, ( which MCs have to pass to start in the programme.)
• MC Assessment Forms ,
• Questionnaire to the MC,
• Radio Monitoring Forms,
• Training Materials Analysis Forms
The frequency of training and numbers trained (by age and gender) are well documented and the
Nomaindas and MCs appear to be regularly checked by Field Officers and Supervisors to ensure that
they are closely following the curriculum and remain engaging to the local population. Feedback Forms

24
25

Clearly this is only a statistical example using averages and should not be quoted out of context.

Often people link themselves to mosques and a useful guide to how many MC are needed in each
village can be based on the number of mosques.
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allow supervisor to give MCs and Nomaindas constructive feedback and support concerning their
delivery of the message following assessment.

Findings of 3.2:
Committees

Monitoring requirements to supervise MA delivered by Mine

⇒ There is a need for occasional evaluation of the coverage and success of transfer of knowledge
among the villagers themselves. The village questionnaires conducted during this evaluation were
the first of their kind in terms of assessing the mine smart knowledge and other issue of the
trainees themselves. In terms of assessing the coverage of the MCs the programme needs to
monitor villagers to establish how successful the MC is in reaching their community. The results of
the questionnaires and in particular the case studies indicate that while almost all the MCs claim
they are reaching all their communities, the evidence suggests their coverage is far lower. These
aspects of the work of the MCs needs more monitoring.
⇒ The monitoring of the MCs themselves by the monthly Nomainda visits and through spot checks by
Supervisors and Field Officers testing appear to be sufficient. It is also an effective information
transfer opportunity for HI as during these visits the Nomainda collects village data (accidents,
minefields and UXO) as well as training numbers.
⇒ Nomaindas should be commended on their considerable dedication in visiting such a large number
of MC every month in difficult climatic and geographical conditions but they should not be overburdened with too many MCs or else the quality of their monitoring will undoubtedly fall.

3.3

The time frame required before a Mine Committee is able to fulfil its duties.

After 12 years of mine survey, mine marking and mine clearance MAPA consider that they have only
cleared 39% of all high priority land. 61% remains to be cleared. Overall, considering high and low
priority land (low priority clearance has not begun) 40% of all mined areas are considered low priority. In
addition to this new information about previously unrecorded mines continues to be collected by the
CBMAP and other agencies. UXOs are another aspect of the problem (and one that claims an
increasing, proportionately, amount of lives) which is only beginning to be addressed after an internal
analysis in MAPA that showed that only 5% of MAPA resources were devoted to dealing with UXO
despite the scale of the problem and high risk to the population (especially the youth).26
The scale of the mine problem in Afghanistan is vast: mine clearance and EOD is very slow. A some of
the case studies have revealed, villager can still face considerable risk even after mine clearance teams
have performed some clearance around their village. Current tasking and prioritisation by MAPA dose
not necessarily result in mine/UXO free villages after a clearance team has left (see case studies 2 & 9
in particular.)
The unfortunately reality is that villagers and especially the kuchi continue to be at risk. In all the case
studies where villagers considered their village itself to be risk-free the population requested a
continuation/or start of mine awareness as their people travelled into other areas regularly, they grazed
animals far from the village and searched for wood on distant mountains or hills. Mine awareness needs
to continue and be repeated. Mines and UXO have a long life-span and will continue to affect
subsequent Afghan children and adults. Children born after the end of the last war are currently dying
and being maimed. This new generation need mine awareness as will the next generation. Whether
they get it or not will depend on the commitment of agencies to deliver it and donors to fund it. It is
26

Handicap is included in the new initiative that will raise new EOD teams in existing agencies spread
over the country ( Halo Trust, ACT, DDG, MCPA and HI)
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therefore paramount that low-cost and sustainable systems are established to disseminate mine
awareness and make it part of the village life and culture.

Findings of 3.3: Time Frame Issues
⇒ The duties of a MC can be defined in terms of ideals or absolutes: When all the village or
community is knowledgeable about mine awareness and avoid any risk taking behaviour and are
able to successfully pass on this information to new comers and their new generation of children,
then the duties to the MC may be complete. Also when there are no accidents to report and when
all UXO and ammunition or newly identified minefields are reported then there will be no need for a
MC. It is highly unlikely that the international community will continue to fund mine action to reach
these objectives. The need to create a sustainable and cost-effective mine awareness system is
therefore crucial. It appears that the CBMAP has developed a powerful mechanism to achieve this.
⇒ The CBMAP system is evaluated to be very appropriate to facilitate a long term or short term
involvement by HI. They have set up a low cost systems with considerable ‘economies of scale’
advantages that requires low staff and low maintenance. In terms of sustainability 98% of MCs
interviewed indicated that they would continue to act as the mine committee even if the Nomaindas
(i.e. CBMAP) stopped to support them or visit them.
⇒ Theoretically the life-span of MC can continue until the mines/UXO threat in rural areas has ended.
More realistically HI will probable need to develop a criteria for exit from one area in order to devote
more recourses to another province or set of districts. Criteria such as; number of accidents,
number of minefields, their proximity to the village, number of UXO reports, assessed level of ‘mine
smart’ knowledge in the village and how many years HI has already worked in the village would
need to be part of the exit assessment. The interesting aspect concerning a potential exit of
CBMAP from certain villages is that there is a high chance that the MC created there will continue
in their role.

3.4

The life-span of a Mine Committee and the reasons for stopping delivering MA.

It must be recognised that the MCs are volunteers and unpaid. As such the CBMAP may have
expectations of the MCs and may seek to encourage and support MCs but clearly can not obligate MC
to perform. The reality is that there are very active MCs and others who are less active. Personal
circumstances sometime require MC to be absent from their villages from time to time in an some cases
they leave for many months and on rarer occasions leave the country. This should be expected when
dealing with a volunteer corps of over 1300. It is the Nomaindas and supervisors duty to monitor the
progress of MCs in this regard.
To date very few trained MC since the start of the programme have stopped working and withdrawn.
Those who have left the programme since 1996 are only 6% of the total trained. Some ex-MCs were
located and questioned. All said they stopped working due to personal circumstance and all said they
considered the continuation of mine awareness to be important. Section 2.4.1 above covers these issue
in more detail.
.
Considering the period of time that many of the MCs have been operational (3-5 years) it is remarkable
that the drop-out rate is not higher. Even with paid staff one would expect a higher turn-over over a
similar time period. The overall approach of the CBMAP combined with the particular social and cultural
attitudes of rural Afghanistan appears to result in a highly appropriate and sustainable network system.
This evaluation sees no reason for the situation to change in this regard.
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Considering ‘Exit Strategies’.

If Nomaindas are ‘servicing’ an maximum of 65 mine committees in their districts27, the cost of paying a
Nomainda (with additional supervision and transport costs) to visit each MC every months to supervise
the work of the MC and collect data is very low. This should be considered carefully before HI develops
a strategy to ‘exist’ communities that may have received the CBMAP for some years. A simplistic
division of total project costs between current numbers of MC indicates that MC cost approximately
$20 a month. However by the end of 2001 for the same overall programme costs the increase of MCs
created could reduce the costs per MC to between $10- $15 per month. This cost could fall further as
the programme develops the number of MC. With the current structure the co-ordinator considers that
they could comfortably service over 2,400 MCs, i.e. double the current level.
It is instructive to examine the all the various benefits that accrue form this low MC cost:
⇒ It enables a Nomaindas to give direct training to as many members of the community (incl. kuchi)
as possible and establish a MC.
⇒ The established MC gives refresher training and holds radio forums repeatedly to the villagers.
⇒ HI obtains precise information on a monthly basis about any accidents in the area .
⇒ HI obtains precise information on a monthly basis about any UXO/ammunition in the area which will
is passed on to MAPA but will be used by their EOD teams in the near future for direct intervention.
⇒ HI obtains information on a monthly basis about any previously unidentified mined areas from the
villagers.
⇒ HI is able to offer referral advice to mine victims in rural locations concerning medical assistance
prosthetics and rehabilitation.
⇒ Of course included in this ‘per-MC’ cost are the benefits of the central and provincial offices, the
interaction between HI Afghanistan and the wider mine action community in country (MAPA) and
world-wide, and linkages with other initiatives (EOD, ICBL activities, Landmine Monitor,etc).
Despite these considerable benefits that are obtainable over a wide are of rural Afghanistan and
relatively low cost, ‘exit’ issues need to be raised. In the 3 provinces where CBMAP has been operating
the longest (3-5 years) the questionnaire results indicated that 81% of adults who had not received any
mine awareness felt that their village was directly at risk from mines . In these provinces (Helmand,
Zabul and Kandahar) it has been assumed that the district Nomaindas have already covered all
affected villages with direct training and created MC where necessary. The results of the questionnaire
raises some serious doubt over their selection process. Perhaps the resources aimed at the villages
where MCs have been active for 3-5 years should be directed to other villages that consider themselves
at risk but which have been ‘missed’ or ignored by the CBMAP for some reason. As mentioned in other
sections 2.2 this indicates a weakness in allowing the Nomaindas to make the village selection at the
district level.
HI needs to examine their selection of villages, especially in areas where HI has been involved for some
years but where there is evidence that some villages that perceive themselves to need mine awareness
but are not receiving any.
HI needs to develop a criteria for reducing, or curtailing its activities in selected villages and/or districts.
This report cannot suggest a policy but recommends that the criteria for reconsidering the status of a
village should at least include the following:
1. An assessment indicating that the MC is active and that ‘mine smart’ knowledge is high in the
community.
2. Indication that there are no reports of injuries and deaths by mines or UXO in the community.
3. That there are no longer reports of UXO and minefields coining from the community.

27

This figure was suggested by the current national co-ordinator of CBMAP
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If any of the above criteria is not occurring then, due to the low marginal cost of each MC, the ‘exit’
could be delayed. If all criteria are evident then CBMAP should consider a limited or total withdrawal of
their contact with the village and allow the Nomainda to concentrate on other areas. In areas were there
is very low risk and where MCs appear to be active and able to complete form, HI may want to consider
that the Nomaindas only visit the village on a less frequent quarterly basis for example. At the moment
the project implementation is somewhat black and white with villages fully integrated in the network or
totally outside it. This does not allow for the subtleties of reality where different villagers in CBMAP
have different risk levels. HI needs to develop its ‘servicing’ or contact with MCs according to different
criteria.
Findings of 3.5 Concerning Exit Strategies
⇒ The development of the MC structure has not been maximised with the existing, funded structure
and there can be increase with some effort but little extra cost. HI should try to maximise the impact
of created MC before withdrawing, or moving to other provinces
⇒ The MC structure yields at low cost a wide range of important information that would otherwise be
costly to obtain.
⇒ Nevertheless and exist strategy does need to be developed, not for theoretical reason but practical
reasons: to allow HI to work in other area and meet unmet needs within the provinces they cover.
Also to allow the MCs to be sustainable and ‘free-standing’.

⇒ Due to an identified dubious selection process where the Nomaindas have chosen the district MC,
HI needs to combine a reduction of attention in areas where they have worked for some years with
an increased focus on outstanding areas of perceived need.
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Summary of all findings with specific recommendations and
conclusions:
The findings here are summarised for ease of reading and to relate
recommendations to specific findings and some general conclusions.
Findings of 1.1 Achievements as set against stated goals, aims and objectives.
⇒ Specific results
With respect to these specific results the CBMAP has, between August 1999 and April 2001 (two
months short of the contract period with the EC) :
 Trained (direct and indirect) in mine awareness over 736, 000 villagers and pastoral nomads
(Kuchie). This is an over achievement of 350% above the target number.
 Created 542 new mine committee. This is an over achievement of 135% above the target level.
 Documented and collected 1664 ammunition reports from affected villages. An over achievement of
277%.
These achievements are very commendable and illustrate that the system in place to achieve these
different project output are working well and to far higher levels than expected. Possibly they also show
that HI set their targets low or are not aware themselves of the capacity of their system to generate
these results. It should be clear that these levels of achievement will probably not be repeated in the
future in the same areas: There will be a finite limit to how many Mine Committees (MCs) a province
needs and how many people need training. Equally there will be a limit to how many ammunition reports
HI will receive from the same areas over time.
⇒ Reducing mine incidents
With respect to the stated goal of reducing mine incidents in the project area it must be said that
seeking to establish a direct correlation between changes in mine/UXO incidents and mine awareness
dissemination is problematic and misleading. By isolating mine awareness training as a single factor
affecting mine/UXO incidents this evaluation would be ignoring the fact that mine / UXO incidents are
the result of a complex interplay of physical, seasonal and attitudinal factors. There are serious limiting
factors in assessing this objective. This has also been found to be the case in other countries where an
evaluation of mine awareness impact has been attempted as well as in a previous national mine
awareness evaluation (CIET 1998) in Afghanistan. Nevertheless some findings concerning this central
CBMAP objective and these can be found below in section 1.4.
⇒ Sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network
Concerning the creation of a sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network, the
programme has developed an approach that has proved to be sustainable (to date) and has resulted in
an effective mine information network that almost entirely covers mine affected districts of southern
Afghanistan, including Ghazni to the east and Farah to the west. In addition it appears that the network
of information gathering and mine awareness dissemination will be sustainable in the long term due to
the structure of the CBMAP and the particular social and cultural conditions of rural Afghanistan. This is
discussed throughout the report and particularly section 3.
⇒ Information transfer network
Currently the programme covers hundreds of villages in 41 districts in the five provinces. Three districts
regarded as mine affected and needing mine awareness (according to HI’s internal needs assessment)
are not yet covered. The network of mine committees continues to grow every month increasing
CBMAP’s coverage. The approach currently used for this information transfer from HI to villagers (i.e.
mine awareness) and from villagers to the mine action community ( victim data and munitions reports
via HI) is judged to be an extraordinarily effective network in terms of reaching a large amount of rural
people through a relatively low-cost and low-maintenance staffing structure. The details of the level of
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effectiveness of this mine awareness approach, and the substance, reliability and end use of the
information network is evaluated in various sections below.
Conclusion: As the rest of the study will illustrate, the CBMAP is clearly meeting its targets and
aims very well in terms of measurable indicators. Where the indicators are not measurable there
is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest the programme is successful in achieving a
sustainable methodology and which transfers information but it cannot be proved that CBMAP
is directly reducing accidents and injury.

Findings of 1.2.1: Statistical comparison between villages in terms of ‘mine smart’
knowledge
⇒ In terms of ‘mine smart’ knowledge, based on the key, repeated messages of CBMAP, those
villagers within Handicap’s mine awareness programme clearly have a higher knowledge than
those outside the programme. The kuchi , some of whom had received some direct training scored
a little higher than those communities that had received no training at all.
⇒ Many of the questions relating to mine awareness in general are common sense and therefore it is
not surprising that those not trained by the CBMAP still scored relatively highly overall (70%) on
mine awareness questions. ( e.g. When asked whether ‘there is ever a situation where it is good to
touch a mine.’ extremely few people would respond to the affirmative whether they had been
trained or not!)
⇒ It is pertinent that those villagers outside of CBMAP activities scored lower on the more demanding
questions concerning recognition of minefields, how to recognise mine marking, natural signs and
what are the safest activities when you find yourself in an unknown or mined area. The mine smart
knowledge concerning these kinds of questions require a range of responses and need to be taught
for people to be aware of them. Where HI has been training the knowledge is significantly higher on
these issues, particularly when comparing the children.
⇒ We can conclude that the statistics from the results of the questionnaires illustrate that adults and
children within CBMAP possess significantly more ‘mine smart’ knowledge. This is a positive
affirmation of the programmes success in transferring ‘mine smart’ knowledge. It does not ,
however, illustrate to what level this knowledge may influences changes away from risk-taking
behaviour.
Conclusion: The statistics indicate that people exposed to mine awareness through the direct
and indirect methodology do develop higher levels of mine smart knowledge . The system can
be said to be successful in this regard.

Findings 1.2.2: Gender separation
⇒ A very small percentage of women receive mine awareness through CBMAP. Although there are
low levels of accidents among women they should have access to mine awareness education.
Islamic culture and the particular interpretation by the Taleban regime currently restricts this.
⇒ A greater number of girls have access to mine awareness but it is still far less that the number of
boys. CBMAP can take advantage of the access to pre-pubescent girls and offer mine awareness
training to this group where possible.
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⇒ Village boys are generally about 10% more ‘mine smart’ than girls (according to the questionnaire
results) whether they have received mine awareness training or not. Kuchi girls and boys were
found to be about equal in terms of 'mine smart' knowledge.
⇒ In villages where CBMAP operates girls scored well on questions concerning touching and contact
with mine/UXO but weak on the more practical situational questions.
Recommendation
1:
That HI continues to strive to reach as many girls and women as possible. Today's girls are
tomorrow's women. Nomaindas and MCs should be encouraged in this regard. HI should
continue to examine alternative approaches that may enable them to teach women more
(husband and wife teams etc).

Findings of 1.3: Impact of training on behavioural change
⇒ The evidence from the 210 adult villagers and 76 adult kuchi interviews indicates that people
themselves regard mine awareness as having changed their behaviour in relation to mines/UXO.
They value mine awareness and want regular refresher indirect training as they see it as being
linked to safer behaviour around mines/UXO.
⇒ The Mine Committees questioned for this evaluation (60 in 5 provinces) all claim that their
communities have changed their behaviour towards mine/UXO to some degree. They list particular
changes of activities as evidence of this. If their claims are accurate this is a positive indicator that
mine awareness is having an impact in this regard.
⇒ The statistical data in one province (Helmand) strongly indicates a big reduction in injuries and
deaths between 1996-2000. Within this data the number of child-victims due to playing and
tampering also greatly reduced as a proportion of the total. This could indicate that CBMA has been
successful at some level, but unfortunately data from other provinces that have also been receiving
CBMA for some years do not indicate similar trends. The data is too weak to draw reliable
conclusions.
⇒ That the successful development of large amounts of ammunitions reports from villagers through
the MCs cannot be used as a indication of behavioural change, even though there is strong
circumstantial evidence to suggest that people no longer touch items and make and effort to report
them to the MC as a result of the presence and trainings of the MCs. This is a positive indicator of
safer practices resulting from the project.
⇒ That the measurement of behavioural change continues to be a challenge to those implementing
and evaluating mine awareness where no reliable baseline victim data or behavioural analysis
exists. Without these no serious conclusions can be drawn during or following programme
implementation.
Recommendation
2:
To measure behavioural change HI will have to maintain more rigorous data collection
concerning victims of UXO and mines. In addition a system to document behaviour before and
after HI interventions should be established. There is still a chance to start such a baseline in
Ghazni and any new provinces. Without these tools HI will never be able to measure these
central aspects of their programme.
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Findings for 1.4.1 Poor Data
⇒ What this means is that MAPA (and its implementing partners including HI) have not realised, and
therefore have not set as a priority over the last 12 years of operations, the considerable power of
victim data as a planning tool to direct humanitarian mine action intervention. Neither have they or
other mine action agencies recognised the critical need to establish a baseline data in terms of
victim data in order monitor progress. The central aim of humanitarian mine action is, presumably,
the relief of the threat of mines for the population and not simply the clearance of land.
⇒ From a national point of view it is clear that the collection of reliable data is in a very poor state and
the current dependency on national data from the ICRC is seriously flawed. Any quotations of
changes in injury/death levels in recent years in Afghanistan must therefore be resisted as there is
no method of substantiation. People are talking about a significant drop in casualty rates but there
is no reliable data to support this at the national level. A rigorous system needs to be put in place
as soon as possible along the lines of the HI proposal of 2000. Further discussion of this is beyond
the scope of this evaluation.
Conclusion: The establishment of a national systematic and dedicated service for victim data
collection is essential in Afghanistan, as soon as possible.

Findings of 1.4.2 Constraints to finding correlations
⇒ Data collection of mine and UXO victims in Afghanistan is poor and has been neglected for may
years. The low commitment to data collection is indicative of a lack of awareness of how important
this data is to prioritising and planning mine action intervention as well a providing a basis for
programme evaluation.
⇒ HI have created the basis for a good data-collecting network in selected provinces but have not
processed the information consistently and have not prioritised this aspect of their work among their
staff. Nevertheless victim data has been reported by HI every month in their reports and submitted
to MAPA, despite MAPA’s repeated failure to manage and process this information in their own
reports or publications.
⇒ A correlation between CBMAP and changes in victim data can not be made. The available data is
ambiguous and because it lacks consistency no conclusions can be made. There is no statistical
evidence that accidents reduce where CBMAP operates. This does not, however mean that it is not
happening, just we can not show it statistically. If data is collected in areas where CBMAP do not
operate (and which are mine/UXO affected) it may be possible to illustrate, in future years, that the
impact of CBMAP reduces accidents. At this stage it is impossible.
⇒ Even where reliable data-bases of victims exist (only Cambodia at present) there is no
substantiated evidence that mine awareness or any activity of mine action directly leads to mine
accident reductions. In a post-conflict and rehabilitation situation there are simply too many other
factors that account for these changes and mine action activities can rarely be isolated as the main
causal factor of change.
Recommendation
3:
HI makes every effort to maintain a consistent and systematic coverage of the 41 districts where
it works in terms of victim data collection. Supervisors and Nomaindas needs to understand the
importance of this. Furthermore that it seeks funding as a matter of priority for the Mine Victim
Information System for which it wrote a proposal approximately 16 months ago. Not only would
this provide an important contribution to mine action in Afghanistan but would increase HIs
credibility.
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Findings for all 1.5: Capacity and motivation assessment of direct and indirect
mine awareness trainers.
⇒ The Nomainda –based system is highly effective at developing a pyramidal structure with fast
expansion capacity for information gathering as well as mine awareness dissemination.
⇒ Nomaindas perform a central task in the CBMAP under difficult conditions. Their determination and
continuity should be commended.
⇒ The selection and recruitment of MCs appears to be appropriate and the concept of using only
village volunteers is a central aspect of HI's concept in CBMAP.
⇒ The ability of MCs to reach all members of their community must not be exaggerated. It is clear this
is not the case and remedial attention is required by HI to address this deficiency.
⇒ The motivation of MCs is primarily religious and humanitarian. Afghanistan may be a unique
context in which a system of this nature can flourish. Possibly not replicable in other countries.
⇒ The effectiveness of this 'information transfer system' could be harnesses for other humanitarian
concerns outside of mines.
⇒ HI's failure to develop a different structure to address the issue of meeting the needs of the Kuchi
represents a lost opportunity and should be corrected .
⇒ The potential for expansion of the HI system is considerable.
⇒ HI's role in their current 5 provinces will change over time as they consolidate the programme:
'production' figures will cease to be meaningful as a measure of the programmes' success and
dynamism.
⇒ Measure of the success of the programme needs to focus more on change of behaviour, increase
in mine smart knowledge and clear reduction in numbers of preventable accidents.
Conclusions: That the current village volunteer system is highly effective, sustainable and
appropriate in the Afghan context. HI should remain committed to this approach, expand it
where possible and assist other agencies to see the benefits of this approach.
Recommendation
4:
That HI immediately instruct the Nomaindas and supervisors to begin checking how much of
their designated community the MCs actually have contact with. In areas where the risk is still
high and it is found that the MC do not reach a high number of the population new MCs should
be created.
Recommendation
5:
HI must develop a new approach to dealing with Kuchi groups that are moving about the south
of Afghanistan but are missed by the MC system. They are the most vulnerable sections of the
community and sustain a high proportion of the accidents. HI needs to prioritise this group as
soon as possible.

Findings of 1.6 Community perceptions and expectations of mine awareness
interventions.
⇒ The perception of the vast majority of the communities where CBMAP operates is highly supportive
of the existence and continuation of mine awareness training. HI have clearly developed a
methodology and approach which is both acceptable and perceived as relevant to communities.
⇒ Communities indicate a strong desire for mine awareness to continue and with frequency. This
suggests that there is a strong basis for the sustainability of the programme.
⇒ That the kuchis have a high interest in receiving more mine awareness and due to their uniquely
vulnerable status in Afghanistan in relation to mines HI should put more emphasis into providing
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kuchis with systematic mine awareness training in stead of the ad hoc visits by Nomaindas and
MCs.

Findings of 1.7: HI/CBMAP as part of the overall Mine Acton Programme for
Afghanistan(MAPA)
⇒ Strategically and operationally it is important for HI to remain a participating member of MAPA
despite the fact that the programme has felt few direct benefits in terms of mine awareness
ideology or shared experience from other mine awareness agencies and MAPA itself.
⇒ That the volunteer network in many hundreds of villages in affected areas gives HI a high capacity
for valuable information transfer . This can be seen in the high levels of trainees as well as the
victim data information and ammunition reports which are useful to MAPA.
⇒ That HI’s link through the RMAC with EOD teams in other agencies has enabled ammunition
reports to be addressed in the past. Due to the high number of requests generated there is a need
for more EOD teams and that HI’s plan to develop 2 new EOD teams in 2001 is commendable, if
not overdue.
⇒ That despite the disappointing standard of victim data collection and processing nationally, HI is
establishing a solid basis and is well placed to improve the data collected in its regions
substantially. That it should continue to submit all victim data to MAPA as it tries to improve its
management of this data.In this regard HI should vigorously promote the establishment of the
national data collection plan as laid out in the AMVIS proposal written in 2000.
Conclusion: That HI can afford to raise it profile and effectiveness in mine action in Afghanistan.
It has a structure and a credibility and 6 years of experience. The recent decision to establish
EOD teams is an excellent development. Establishing a national database would also be of great
value.
Recommendation
6:
HI is a mine action NGO and therefore should not restrict itself to certain sub-sectors like mine
awareness within mine action. The aim is to reduce injuries and clear away the threat.. HI
should take a more proactive approach and be less hesitant in this regard. After 12 years of
mine action in Afghanistan the accident rate are still unacceptably high.

Findings of 2.1: Project structure and resources
⇒ This evaluation finds the management structure to be simple and effective, with a low level of paid
staff able to control a network that benefits 41 districts, thousands of villages and reaches hundreds
of thousands of people . The Nomaindas and supervisors should be commended for their
dedication in particularly difficult geographical and climatic conditions, having to traverse vast areas
of the 41 districts they cover in Southern Afghanistan.
⇒ The current structure has considerable potential for further expansion in terms of reaching more
communities with mine awareness (creating more MCs) without increasing the number of paid staff.
The current co-ordinator feels that the number of MC could double (giving each Nomainda and
average of 65 MC each) without increasing the staff number or structure. These ‘economies of
scale’ are a major benefit of the CBMAP design
Recommendation
7:
That considering the economies of scale with the CBMAP system, HI seeks to maximise its
capacity within the current structure by maximising the number of MCs under each Nomainda.
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Findings of 2.2: Project coverage and selection mechanisms
⇒ This evaluation realises that this section is inconclusive and sheds little light on the scope of HI’s
coverage. Nevertheless it is clear that in the 5 provinces there are 38 Nomaindas working in the
most affected districts. Their duty is to give direct training throughout the district in mine affected
villages and kuchi camps. To what extent this is occurring cannot be measured at this stage except
by the considerable numbers of trainees in all locations and the establishment of large numbers of
MCs (over 1150) and visits made to at least 4,200 villages in the last 6 years.
⇒ As indicated there is a weakness in the selection system concerning villages within districts. HI
needs to have a more rigorous process of ensuring that other villagers that are not currently
included in the work of Nomainda and MC are not at risk. The questionnaire result appear to show
that many people living in such areas consider themselves at risk and in need of mine awareness.
Recommendaion
8:
That HI reviews the selection system at the district level as soon as possible to ensure that
villages that regard themselves at risk have not been left out of the mine awareness network.
Evidence from the questionnaires suggest this is the case. Village selection of MCs should not
and cannot just be left to the Nomaindas.

Findings of 2.3: Staff monitoring and training
⇒ The current structure of monitoring and training appear to be working well and meeting the needs of
different levels of management. The frequent 3-monthly training for Field Officers, Supervisors and
Nomainda is judged to be very positive in terms of keeping a close control of standards, monitoring
problems as they arise, and developing a strong team spirit.
⇒ This evaluation found that more control was needed concerning the understanding by field staff of
the importance of coverage and village selection. This is discussed in more detail above in section
2.2.

Findings of 2.4.1 Status & function of the Mine Committee
⇒ The social status of the Mine Committees appears to be appropriate to the task in so far that they
operate within social groups of which they themselves are part.
⇒ The fact that the community themselves indicate to the Nomaindas whether they want a MC
operating in their village, and that the MC himself volunteers knowing there are no incentives
(except the honour), is a good measure of the willingness of villages to participate in HI’s mine
awareness network.
⇒ The fact that the majority of the MC volunteers are respected members of their communities
indicates that mine awareness training as developed through this programme is taken seriously by
community leaders which in turn guarantees a high level of attendance by villagers at indirect
training sessions.
⇒ Considering the social and cultural context of Afghanistan this evaluation finds that the current
system of MC recruitment and support works well and is appropriate for settled communities. The
current system with respect to Kuchies appears to be weak with only 5 active MC in these
communities. If the existing recruitment and support structure for MC is not appropriate for Kuchies
and alternative needs to be found as soon as possible.
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Findings of 2.5 Materials and Methodologies
⇒ Considering the restrictions set by the Taleban, the current tools, materials and methodologies
appear to serve the training staff well. Those exposed to mine awareness through this approach
appear to be more ‘mine smart’ than those not exposed to training, but direct correlations with ‘mine
smart’ knowledge and incident reduction can still not be made.
⇒ This evaluation considers the BBC drama to be an excellent tool that they should take full
advantage of in terms of encouraging their MC and Nomaindas to promote the drama. Its popularity
is proven and due to HI’s involvement with BBC they are in a strong position to help guide the
producers concerning the content of the broadcasts.
⇒ Buying cheap radios is a false economy and that in the future better quality radios should be
purchased and that radio distribution should be seen as an essential tool of all mine committees.
Recommendation 9:
HI takes full advantage of the BBC dramas and make it an immediate priority to provide decent
radios and batteries to support and promote village forums among as many villages as possible.
It may also be a good approach for Kuchi. In terns of per-village cost it is a very low-cost way of
enabling people to hear mine awareness (and other public health messages). The cheapest
radios should be avoided.

Findings of 3.1 MC coverage and MC reputation
⇒ Generally this evaluation finds that the supervisors and Nomaindas need to monitor MCs more
carefully to ensure that where there are sections of the community or village where the MC cannot
train, they consider creating new MCs. Achieving maximum coverage is important.
⇒ It is noted that villagers appear to associate their memory of receiving mine awareness training
much more with the visit of the Nomainda that the informal training of the MCs. This does not
necessarily indicate that the MCs are less successful. CBMAP will needs to look into these issues
in more detail (through questioning villages and selected case studies) if a deeper analysis is
needed.
⇒ Issues concerning coverage and reputation of the MC are directly related to the sustainability and
the efficiency of the programme.
Conclusion: MC coverage and reputation appear to be of a high standard which bodes well for
the sustainability and effectiveness of the programme.

Findings of 3.2: Monitoring requirements to supervise MA delivered by Mine
Committees
⇒ There is a need for occasional evaluation of the coverage and success of transfer of knowledge
among the villagers themselves. The village questionnaires conducted during this evaluation were
the first of their kind in terms of assessing the mine smart knowledge and other issue of the
trainees themselves. In terms of assessing the coverage of the MCs the programme needs to
monitor villagers to establish how successful the MC is in reaching their community. The results of
the questionnaires and in particular the case studies indicate that while almost all the MCs claim
they are reaching all their communities, the evidence suggests their coverage is far lower. These
aspects of the work of the MCs needs more monitoring.
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⇒ The monitoring of the MCs themselves by the monthly Nomainda visits and through spot checks by
Supervisors and Field Officers testing appear to be sufficient. It is also an effective information
transfer opportunity for HI as during these visits the Nomainda collects village data (accidents,
minefields and UXO) as well as training numbers.
⇒ Nomaindas should be commended on their considerable dedication in visiting such a large number
of MC every month in difficult climatic and geographical conditions but they should not be overburdened with too many MCs or else the quality of their monitoring will undoubtedly fall.
Recommendation 10:
That, at least every year, HI try to conduct village based questionnaires to find out how
successful the mine awareness message transfer is going using the nomaindas and MCs. The
aim of the programme is to effect this transfer and that this in turn should effect a change in
behaviour. HI must have an internal mechanism to monitor the progress of these issues.

Findings of 3.3: Time Frame Issues
⇒ The duties of a MC can be defined in terms of ideals or absolutes: When all the village or
community is knowledgeable about mine awareness and avoid any risk taking behaviour and are
able to successfully pass on this information to new comers and their new generation of children,
then the duties to the MC may be complete. Also when there are no accidents to report and when
all UXO and ammunition or newly identified minefields are reported then there will be no need for a
MC. It is highly unlikely that the international community will continue to fund mine action to reach
these objectives. The need to create a sustainable and cost-effective mine awareness system is
therefore crucial. It appears that the CBMAP has developed a powerful mechanism to achieve this.
⇒ The CBMAP system is evaluated to be very appropriate to facilitate a long term or short term
involvement by HI. They have set up a low cost systems with considerable ‘economies of scale’
advantages that requires low staff and low maintenance. In terms of sustainability 98% of MCs
interviewed indicated that they would continue to act as the mine committee even if the Nomaindas
(i.e. CBMAP) stopped to support them or visit them.
⇒ Theoretically the life-span of MC can continue until the mines/UXO threat in rural areas has ended.
More realistically HI will probable need to develop a criteria for exit from one area in order to devote
more resources to another province or set of districts. Criteria such as; number of accidents,
number of minefields, their proximity to the village, number of UXO reports, assessed level of ‘mine
smart’ knowledge in the village and how many years HI has already worked in the village would
need to be part of the exit assessment. The interesting aspect concerning a potential exit of
CBMAP from certain villages is that there is a high chance that the MC created there will continue
in their role.

Findings for 3.5

Considering ‘Exit Strategies’.

⇒ The development of the MC structure has not been maximised with the existing, funded structure
and there can be increase with some effort but little extra cost. HI should try to maximise the impact
of created MC before withdrawing, or moving to other provinces
⇒ The MC structure yields at low cost a wide range of important information that would otherwise be
costly to obtain.
⇒ Nevertheless and exist strategy does need to be developed, not for theoretical reason but practical
reasons: to allow HI to work in other area and meet unmet needs within the provinces they cover.
Also to allow the MCs to be sustainable and ‘free-standing’.
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⇒ Due to an identified dubious selection process where the Nomaindas have chosen the district MC,
HI needs to combine a reduction of attention in areas where they have worked for some years with
an increased focus on outstanding areas of perceived need.

Recommendation:
The criteria for reconsidering the status of a village should at least include the following:
1. An assessment indicating that the MC is active and that ‘mine smart’ knowledge is high in
the community.
2. Indication that there are no reports of injuries and deaths by mines or UXO in the
community.
3. That there are no longer reports of UXO and minefields coining from the community.
If any of the above criteria is not occurring then, due to the low marginal cost of each MC, the
‘exit’ could be delayed. If all criteria are evident then CBMAP should consider a limited or total
withdrawal of their contact with the village and allow the Nomainda to concentrate on other
areas. HI needs to develop its ‘servicing’ or contact with MCs according to different criteria.

